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Abstract
Homeland security is in a pre-paradigm phase as a professional discipline. There are
at least four dozen ways colleges, universities, agencies, and textbook publishers have
conceptualized homeland security education. A review of the principal themes presented
by those entities identified over fifty topics that come under the rubric of “Homeland
Security.” We do not have sufficient information about all the potential audiences for
homeland security courses to say with certainty which subjects should be addressed in
this field. However, we do know a lot about what is involved in homeland security. The
“discipline” of homeland security is actively working to identify core ideas with which
anyone who wishes to speak intelligently about homeland security has to be conversant.
This article describes how the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense
and Security selected particular elements within the uncertainty that is homeland security,
constructed a teaching narrative around those elements, and used that understanding to
fashion our continuously evolving homeland security curriculum and our Introduction to
Homeland Security course.
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INTRODUCTION 
This article describes one way to teach an introductory graduate course in homeland 
security. 
Homeland security is in a pre-paradigm phase.  We understand this to mean that 
unlike medicine, law, engineering, and other professional disciplines, there is no general 
conceptual agreement about the range of topics that constitute homeland security as a 
field of study.  Consequently there is not a dominant approach to teaching homeland 
security.  We happen to think this is a good thing. 
We are aware of almost four dozen ways that colleges, universities, agencies, and 
textbook publishers have conceptualized homeland security education.  These 
organizations include the National Academies, University of Connecticut, Johns Hopkins 
University, Long Island University, Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. Northern 
Command, the Department of Homeland Security, Elsevier, McGraw-Hill, and several 
other universities and textbook publishers.
1
No doubt there are others. 
A cursory review of the principal themes presented by those sources identified over 
fifty topics that come under the rubric of “Homeland Security.”  The subjects include 
(with the most frequently mentioned items listed first):
2
1. Threats to the Homeland 
2. Risk Management and 
Analysis 
3. Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
4. Laws Related to 
Homeland Security 
5. Homeland Security 
Policies & Strategies 
6. Responses to Terrorism 
7. Terrorism 
8. Intelligence 
9. Overview of Homeland 
Security Mission Areas 
10. Organization of 
Homeland Security 
11. Sociology of Homeland 
Security (e.g., politics, 
roles, behavior, power, 
conflict, communication) 
12. Systems Integration and 
Administration of 
Homeland Security 
13. Border Security 
14. Cyber Security 
15. History of Homeland 
Security and Terrorism 
16. Strategic Planning & 
Budgeting 
17. Civilian & Military 
Relationships 
18. Comparative & 
International Homeland 
Security 
19. Federal Role in 
Homeland Security 
20. Future of Homeland 
Security 
21. Preparedness 
22. Private Sector Role in 
Homeland Security 
23. Public Health & Medical 
Issues 
24. Role of State and Local 
Governments 
25. Homeland Security 
Technology 
26. Weapons of Mass 
Destruction 




30. Transportation Security 
31. Basics of Homeland 
Security 
32. Civil Liberties 
33. Decision-Making 
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34. Ethical Issues 
35. Interagency Coordination 
36. Leadership 
37. Media 
38. Politics of Homeland 
Security 
39. Prevention of Terrorism 
40. Psychology of Homeland 
Security 
41. Recovery After an Attack 
42. Risk Communications 
43. Utilities and Industrial 
Facilities Security 
44. Emergency Management 
45. Engineering 
46. Exercises and Training 
47. Geospatial Dimensions of 
Homeland Security 
48. Human Resource 
Management 
49. Modeling & Simulation 
50. Role of Communities in 
Homeland Security 
51. Role of Individuals in 
Homeland Security 
Clearly, there are a variety of subjects that can be taught in a course with “homeland 
security” in its title.   
One might ask: where are the gaps in existing homeland security educational 
programs and what are the correct topics to teach?  We believe it is too early in the 
development of homeland security to be concerned about any gaps; gaps imply a standard 
against which to compare a current position.  Our present task should be to “let a hundred 
flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.”
3
We do not yet know 
enough about who all the audiences are for homeland security courses, what their needs 
are, or what constitutes homeland security to say with certainty which subjects should be 
addressed in this field.
4
Again, for some of us interested in this topic, the intellectual 
freedom this uncertainty encourages is liberating. 
That said, we do know a lot about what is involved in homeland security.  The 
“discipline” of homeland security – if one can call it a discipline for the purposes of this 
article – is actively working to identify core ideas that anyone who wishes to speak 
intelligently about homeland security has to be conversant with.  For us, the authors who 
teach at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
(CHDS), these ideas include an understanding of terrorism, homeland security laws and 
strategies, homeland security programs, and other topics that we include in our 
Introduction to Homeland Security course.
5
This article describes how the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) selected particular 
elements within the uncertainty that is homeland security, constructed a teaching 
narrative around those elements, and used that understanding to fashion our continuously 
evolving homeland security curriculum and our Introduction to Homeland Security 
course. 
We fully recognize that our approach is not the only way.  Nor is it in any objective 




We start with the fundamental assumptions that have shaped the character of what we 
teach in the Introduction course and, to a degree, the curriculum.  Some of our 
assumptions are unique to our institutional context.  However, all homeland security 
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educational programs should be able to articulate the assumptions around which their 
programs are based. 
Assumptions About The Sponsor 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsors our program primarily to expand 
the capability of local and state government, first to prevent terrorism and second to 
reduce vulnerabilities and improve response and recovery.  These objectives directly 
support the priorities of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. DHS wants us to 
educate the next generation of homeland security leaders – people who lead organizations 
and professions related to homeland security, and who are the intellectual and strategic 
leaders in this emerging field. 
DHS wants the people who graduate from our program to further develop their 
critical thinking and creativity skills.  Homeland security as a profession needs people 
who will contribute new ideas; people who are able to identify and critique unexamined 
assumptions of policy, strategy, and their own perspectives; people who have the ability 
to translate good intentions into effective action.  Ideally, these are central traits of the 
next generation of homeland security leadership. 
Another assumption about our sponsor is recognition that it is not our role to advocate 
or defend DHS policies or programs.  DHS and the theories they and the Congress 
espouse about how to secure the homeland are but one node – albeit a critical one – in the 
complexity that is the nation’s homeland security network.  We would do a disservice to 
our sponsor and our students if we allowed training to supplant our education mission.
 6
 
Assumptions About The Students 
The students who attend the Center for Homeland Defense and Security work in mid- and 
senior level government positions related to homeland security: e.g., law enforcement, 
fire services, public health, emergency management, and other disciplines, including 
homeland security.  They come to the program with knowledge about homeland security, 
or at least about their areas of expertise in the field.  The overwhelming majority of 
students are civilians working a minimum of fifty to sixty hours per week for state and 
local governments.  The students are oriented more to practice than to theory, to applied 
knowledge rather than analysis.  While many of them have advanced degrees, most of the 
students have been out of school for a significant number of years.   
Our approach is to assume the students are participants in the course rather than an 
audience for what we have to deliver.
7
In that sense they are co-creators of what we do.  
We think this is an important part of our educational approach because audiences receive 
what is offered, participants help to shape it. 
Another assumption that we have about our students is their sponsoring organizations 
and DHS select them because they are current leaders or next-generation homeland 
security leaders.  
Assumptions About Teaching 
Teaching in the Introduction course is premised on andragogical principles as opposed to 
pedagogical principles.
8
The andragogical model has four assumptions: 
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1. Adults are most interested in learning about subjects that have immediate 
relevance to their job or personal life. 
2. Adult learning is problem-centered rather than content-oriented. 
3. Experience (war stories) provides a useful basis for learning activities. 
4. Adults need to be involved in the planning and evaluation of their 
instruction. 
From a student's perspective, these principles translate into five instructional directives: 
1. Tell me why I need to know this, or tell me what's in this for me. 
2. Let me decide how I will learn. 
3. Tell me where these ideas fit in with the other things I know. 
4. Sell me on learning this – make it convincing. 
5. Remove the obstacles from my learning path. 
Assumptions About Homeland Security 
We noted there are lots of ideas about what constitutes homeland security, and these 
ideas have not converged on any dominant paradigm.  However, there is an emerging 
Naval Postgraduate School paradigm – pre-paradigm is a better term – outlined by the 
courses we teach in our master’s program. 
We are using paradigm here not in the jargon sense, but in its meaning as a set of 
related ideas that is the basis for framing knowledge and research about a topic.  The NPS 
framework is linked, in the Introduction course, to six “Lines of Inquiry” (described later 
in this article) that allow students to explore the multiple dimensions that make up 
homeland security. 
The Introduction course supports the NPS point of view of homeland security through 
a constructed narrative that outlines the terrain covered by our curriculum, and through 
an advocacy of twelve broad homeland security competence domains we believe are 
important for students to know and understand (in the sense described by Bloom’s 
cognitive domain taxonomy).
9
The narrative we use is a high level description of the ontological space within which 
we place our student group: homeland security leaders.
10
 
• Homeland security leaders exist in a domain characterized by both 
problems and opportunities; 
• That domain is further characterized by solutions that have been proposed 
or proven, and by visions of what could be achieved;  
• The problems, opportunities, solutions and visions exist within a multi-
dimensional social, political, and technical environment that influences 
what constitutes effective action; and 
• There is an evolving set of knowledge that homeland security leaders need 
in order to be effective in this environment. 
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Assumptions About The Introductory Course 
Alfred North Whitehead warned against what he called the mental dry rot created by 
teaching inert ideas.  But he also cautioned, “Do not teach too many subjects.  What you 
teach, teach thoroughly.”
11
 As the list of subjects noted earlier suggests, homeland 
security as an academic field of study is alive with new problems to explore.  That 
presents a predicament.  There is much we seek to cover in the Introduction course, but as 
with almost any graduate course, there is insufficient time to cover it all. 
The eighteen-month master’s degree program brings students to the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) for two weeks every academic quarter.  Typically two 
courses are taken each quarter. 
Our Introduction class is a four credit-hour course, which translates to forty contact 
hours with each student; twenty-eight hours in-residence (in the classroom) and twelve 
hours during the non-residence period (about 1.5 hours a week online).  In addition to the 
forty contact hours, the expectation is for students to spend eighty hours over a three-
month period reading, doing research, writing a strategy memo, and completing other 
work that supplements the contact hours.  Usually the eight to ten weeks between the two 
in-residence sessions at NPS are used for web-based and other distance learning activities 
and writing a strategy memo.  We also assume the Introduction course is integrated with 
and depends on the work students do in two other courses they take: a terrorism course 
and a research methods course.  We rely on those courses to cover material that we do not 
spend much time on, but is important to achieving our overall course objectives. 
Finally, given the ever-changing and growing homeland security environment, we 
assume that the content of the Introduction course will vary each time it is taught.  As of 
March 2006, we have taught the Introduction course eleven times, to more than 150 
students. 
 
GOALS FOR THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE 
The course has two goal categories: behavioral and knowledge.  They are explained in 
the syllabus
12
 as well as during the presentation of the course. 
From a behavioral perspective – or how we want people to be different after taking 
the course – we want students to expand the way they think, analyze and communicate 
about homeland security.  We also seek to expand their mental models or schema of 
homeland security. 
From a knowledge perspective we want them to know two general things: their level 
of knowledge in twelve domains and at least a preliminary understanding of homeland 
security basics. 
Twelve Competency Domains 
The first year the Center for Homeland Defense and Security was in operation, we 
asserted – based on practitioner experience and on empirical evidence
13
 – that effective 
homeland security leaders should be able to demonstrate competency (i.e., have 
knowledge, skills and abilities, as appropriate) in at least twelve substantive areas: 
1. The historical forces that spurred the changes in U.S. strategy, policy and 
organizational design since September 11, 2001. 
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2. The logics, strategies, methods, and consequences of terrorism. 
3. Public information, crisis communications, and managing the fear terrorists 
try to create. 
4. Conventional and unconventional threats to homeland security (e.g., borders, 
transportation, agriculture, health, ports), particularly the vulnerabilities of the 
nation's critical infrastructure. 
5. The strategic leadership challenges and skills demanded by the continuously 
changing multi-agency, multidisciplinary collaborative environment – e.g., 
public agencies, military agencies and the private sector. 
6. The science and technology of weapons of mass destruction, weapons of mass 
exposure, and weapons of mass effects. 
7. The lessons learned from other nations and from history about preventing and 
responding to terrorism. 
8. The relationship between forms of government and social organization, and 
the causes, consequences and responses to terrorism. 
9. The dynamic tension the war on terrorism triggers between the criminal 
justice system and the Constitution – this is the civil liberties issue. 
10. The sources, methods and uses of homeland security information and 
intelligence, especially in an environment where many public agencies, 
private agencies, and the military have acknowledged the new imperative to 
work collaboratively. 
11. The uses and limits of technology in homeland security. 
12. The analytical, planning, budgetary and fiscal frameworks that can assist 
homeland security leaders design effective policies and strategies for the 
myriad substantive issues that constitute homeland security. 
As we gain more experience, our understanding of, and indicators for, competencies also 
change.  This process will be continuous.  We do not suggest that these competencies 
have universal applicability throughout homeland security.  However, we do think they 
are candidate topics for a conversation about the core ideas in homeland security 
professional education. 
Specific Subjects 
What we described above is the general knowledge framework that informs our program.  
While we do not provide an in-depth treatment of all of these topics in the Introduction 
course, we do cover all of them in our master’s degree curriculum.  We use our 
understanding of the broader NPS homeland security knowledge framework as a basis for 
selecting specific topics to discuss in the Introduction class, and make reference during 
the class discussions to future courses the students will take. 
We strive to cover certain topical areas in the Introduction class which represent the 
minimum students should know before they engage in more advanced homeland security 
study.  The areas include: 
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• The policy objectives of the nation's homeland security efforts. 
• The national strategies for achieving that policy. 
• The implications of the national strategy for state and local homeland 
security strategies, especially with respect to prevention. 
• The basic vocabulary of homeland security. 
• The variety of forces that help and hinder efforts to achieve the homeland 
security strategy (for us, these forces can be represented as a series of 
concentric circles that include – starting from the inner-most element – 
personal, techno/rational, economic, legal, organizational, political, 
cultural, information, decision-making, change, network, and leadership). 
• The role that leadership plays in achieving strategy. 
• How individual, organizational, and social learning affect achieving the 
strategy. 
• The fundamental concepts and theories that are relevant to a leader’s 
understanding of how to be effective in homeland security environments.  
This means how ideas are translated into policy and strategy; how to be 
effective as a network leader. 
• The nature and scope of significant homeland security issues and 
concerns, their causes and consequences.  We tend to emphasize different 
issues each time we teach the course, using them as opportunities to 
emphasize our core themes. 
• Causes, consequences, tactics and logics of terrorism (taught in the 
companion course). 
• The major solutions proposed for homeland security issues and concerns, 
and the pros and cons of the solutions. 
• The organizational implications of homeland security policies and 
strategies. 
• The disciplines, processes, and critiques that constitute the emerging 
profession of homeland security.
14
 
HOW WE CONDUCT THE INTRODUCTION COURSE 
The Introduction course is divided into four phases: 
1. Pre-in-residence 
2. First in-residence 
3. Non-residence 
4. Second in-residence 
 
We have specific objectives for each phase. 
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Pre-In-Residence 
We start working with our students as soon as they are admitted into the program, 
typically six to eight weeks before their first in-residence session.  We contact them via e-
mail to begin their online work.  We provide readings about the past, present, and future 
of homeland security, as the basis for an initial online conversation about homeland 
security.   
In the pre-in-residence we familiarize them with “posting” their conversations online, 
specifically working with the concept of the "usable idea," – tying into their intellectual 
and professional predisposition towards application, and exploring the “critical question” 
– getting them to move conceptually from application to analysis.  All of the online work 
(questions and responses) is visible to everyone in the class.  Our intention is to create a 
dialogue about homeland security experiences and ideas and, in the process, to begin 
building a learning community.  Students are not graded on what they post.  We comment 
on the ideas in a collegial way, and encourage their classmates to do the same.  We use 
the material they produce – the usable ideas and the critical questions – as material for 
exercises and discussions during the first in-residence. 
First In-Residence 
During the first in-residence session we emphasize five of the core ideas in our 
curriculum: 
• Prevention – It is the first priority of the National Strategy.
• Strategy – Our program concentrates more on homeland security strategy 
than on homeland security operations. 
• Leadership – Our mission is to educate homeland security leaders. 
• Critical analysis – We want students to identify assumptions and know 
how to use evidence to inform action. 
• Creativity – We want students to see homeland security more as a canvas 
to paint on than a puzzle to be solved. 
 
After an initial two hour “Introduction to Homeland Security” lecture, where we outline 
the knowledge framework, we work the ideas noted above through a series of exercises 
based on readings, experiences, the NPS homeland security narrative, competencies, and 
topical homeland security issues.
15
 The exercises include: 
• A tabletop exercise, designed as a sort of Rorschach Test about the 
homeland security perspectives students bring to the program.
16
 Most of 
the time we use video vignettes illustrating an element in the cycle of 
homeland security preparedness.  Videos are not needed, however.  One 
can conduct a tabletop exercise using a case study,
17
 or any hypothetical or 
actual homeland security-related situation.
18
 
• An emergence exercise about homeland security leadership. This exercise 
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• A debate about a current homeland security issue.
20
 The debate 
emphasizes critical analysis, and models the skills we want the students to 
use during the strategy briefings in the second in-residence session.  The 
debate is also an opportunity to conduct policy-relevant research, using the 
CHDS/DHS Homeland Security Digital Library.
21
 
• A force field analysis about how things actually happen in homeland 
security.  This exercise is designed to reinforce the concept of critical 
thinking, and to emphasize significant forces in the homeland security 
environment that influence a leader’s effectiveness. 
• A homeland security futures analysis, intended to model how one can 
conceptualize a desired future by focusing on critical environmental 
variables.  It is also a prelude to a “Weak Signals” exercise we conduct 
during the non-residence session. 
At the end of each day’s class, we take time for something called a one-minute feedback.  
We ask students to write a brief comment about an idea that was interesting, something 
that was unclear, something they disagreed with, or other feedback about the day.
22
 The 
next day we respond to their comments as appropriate. 
The Non-Residence Session 
A dedicated course website is used to conduct the non-residence session.  Students have 
four tasks to complete during the eight to ten weeks of the non-residence session: 
Learning Activities, Weak Signals, Question of the Week, and a Strategy Memo.   
• Learning Activities: The learning activities are based on an expanded 
homeland security narrative that we discuss on the course website.  
Depending on the structure of the course during a particular quarter, we 
use one of two types of learning activities.  The first kind involves Lines 
of Inquiry (or LOI), described in more detail below.  The second kind 
involves Questions of the Week.   
• Weak Signals Blog: The blog, and the purpose of the weak signals 
exercise, are explained below. 
• Question of the Week:  We use a short version of this activity when we 
use the Lines of Inquiry as the centerpiece of the non-residence 
experience.  When we are not using the Lines of Inquiry, we do an 
extended Question of the Week exercise.  This activity is described later in 
this article. 
• Strategy Memo:  This seminar paper is a memo designed to address a real-
world strategic problem that the student selects.   
The Learning Activities 
A primary non-residence objective is for each student to complete thirty-five points worth 
of learning activities.  Learning activities are problems or questions based on the topics 
covered in the course.  Students can select from among 400 activities.
23
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An average learning activity is worth between two and three points.  Most require 
completing a short essay (from 200 words to two pages).  Students post their responses 
on the web site, and we make those responses available for everyone to read.   
Each week the instructors select posts that reflect what we are trying to achieve in the 
course, particularly on prevention, strategy, leadership, critical analysis, and creativity.  
We also look for posts that communicate ideas well.  We send a weekly message to 
students telling them about our selection.  We choose posts that model what we are 
looking for. 
Using the grade book feature of the course web site we provide individual comments 
to students on their posts – comments that are only visible to the students.  The comments 
are on the substance of their response and communication and analytical styles.  Rather 
than giving a letter grade, we provide a critical analysis of their posts, and tell them how 
many points they have earned for a particular post.   
Learning activities are drawn from material covered during the first in-residence and 
from material contained on the web site, and in the readings.  When we use learning 
activities as the centerpiece of the non-residence period, we divide the activities into six 
Lines of Inquiry.  (“Line of Inquiry” is a phrase we use to describe one way homeland 
security material can be organized.)  The Lines of Inquiry are: 
1. Homeland security basics – the minimum an educated homeland security 
professional should know.  As noted above, this includes knowing about the 
events, incidents, and forces that gave rise to the need for “homeland” 
security; the contents of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the 
other national strategies that support and complement the national strategy; 
the relationship between state and local homeland security strategies and the 
National Strategy; the structure of homeland security in the United States, 
from the perspective of federalism; the basic statutes that shape homeland 
security’s legal terrain; the contents of Homeland Security Presidential 
Decision Directives; the national guidelines and procedures that structure how 
homeland security strategy and policy are implemented; the reports and other 
documents that have significantly influenced the homeland security debate 
about policy and strategy; how homeland security resources are allocated; and 
the terms used in the discipline of homeland security. 
2. The mission – preventing terrorism; why we are doing that and what is meant 
by prevention. 
3. Strategies – options for accomplishing the mission. 
4. Frameworks – analysis of how things happen in the world of homeland 
security.  Most of the homeland security basics and information about the 
mission and strategies are espoused theories, predictions about the outcomes 
that will occur if certain activities are undertaken.  The Frameworks Line of 
Inquiry draws attention to ideas about how things actually happen in the world 
(somewhat equivalent to “theories-in-use”).  This module includes 
information about the environmental variables outlined earlier in this paper: 
personal, techno/rational, economic, legal, organizational, political, cultural, 
information, decision-making, change, network, and leadership. 
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5. Leadership – especially in a networked, non-hierarchical, multi-agency, multi-
sector, multi-professional environment.  Essentially this is an environment 
where command and control does not operate very effectively.
24
 
6. Learning – how experiences can continuously be transformed into homeland 
security knowledge.  This element is designed to underscore the need for life-
long learning in homeland security. 
Here's how the Learning Activities work in an andragogical context.  The student starts 
with something he or she is interested in – let's say Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5, and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation it 
mandates.  The student reads information about the homeland security presidential 
decision directives, reads HSPD-5 and related implementation documents, and then 
completes a learning activity – for example, an essay about how HSPD-5 affects his or 
her agency – based on the research he/she has conducted. 
In our feedback to the student’s learning activity, we may ask why the student thinks 
HSPD-5 is a strategy.  This potentially leads the student to want to learn more about what 
a strategy is, and then he or she explores the readings and links we suggest about the 
concept of strategy, critiques of existing strategy, and so on.  This can then lead the 
student to complete another learning activity about a related topic, e.g., why strategy is 
such a difficult concept for people to understand, or how to get their agency to focus 
more on strategy.
25
 Or the student may follow a different path, and the initial exploration 
of HSPD-5 might lead the student to want to know more about NIMS, so he or she 
completes the DHS online NIMS course as a learning activity.
26
 
If they do not like any of the learning activities we offer, they have the option of 
designing and completing their own activity.   
We obviously do not expect students to complete all 400 learning activities or all 
lines of inquiry in one course.  We look for them to become familiar with the material so 
they can go back to it during their eighteen months at NPS.  Students typically are able to 
complete required learning activities within the time allotted for the non-residence period. 
The Blog 
We have a weblog called “Changing Homeland Security.”  Students (either as individuals 
or as small groups) are asked to post three "weak signals" about homeland security during 
the non-residence period.  Weak signal is a term that describes ideas or issues just below 
homeland security’s strategic horizon.  The purpose of the weak signals exercise is to 
acquaint the students with looking at future issues and trends.  Weak signals have the 
following characteristics: 
1. They indicate the potential for change, rather than mainstream thinking. 
2. They relate to strategic themes in homeland security. 
3. They have the potential to be wild cards or to portend low probability/high 
consequence events, incidents, or environmental shifts that could affect 
homeland security. 
4. They can suggest strategic blind spots. 
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We have been using the weak signals blog for almost two years, so we have many 
examples of effective and ineffective posts.  In weekly messages to students, we identify 
one or more exemplary blog posts of the week – another way we model what we are 
looking for as students learn to see beyond the mainstream. 
Question of the Week 
We use the Question of the Week exercise to continue the homeland security dialogue 
that started during the first in-residence session.  When we use the Lines of Inquiry 
activity, participation in the Question of the Week is voluntary, but it is part of the 
participation score.  For the most recent Introduction course, we used the following 
questions during the eight week non-residence session. 
1. Select one of the homeland security presidential decision directives 
(HSPD) and identify how it has affected your agency or jurisdiction.  In 
your response, identify the problems and opportunities created by the 
HSPD. 
2. The purpose of this assignment is to conduct a summary assessment of 
your state or community's homeland security strategy.  Starting with the 
criteria suggested in the attached GAO report,
27
 identify the strengths of 
your selected strategy and areas where the strategy could be improved.  
Briefly discuss what has to happen before those improvements are made. 
3. Prevention is the first priority of the nation's homeland security strategy.  
As the two quotations below suggest, we continue to spend more attention 
and money on response than on preventing terrorism.  Why is this, and 
what – if anything – can we do about it?  In a post-Katrina world, is it still 
appropriate that prevention is our first priority? 
We've got to have a prevention strategy that is focused on 
finding those terrorists before they act. Very little, I will 
hasten to add, of what the Department of Homeland 
Security spends its money on these days is devoted to what 
ought to be a high priority. We've got to reconfigure in 
order to do that. – Christopher Cox, (former) Chairman of 
the House Committee on Homeland Security, May 2005 
The Committee is concerned that while terrorism 
prevention is a national priority, little is being done to 
create prevention expertise in our nation's first responders. 
This is in stark contrast to response and recovery training 
programs. Without a well-developed terrorism prevention 
plan, State and local agencies lack a key piece in the fight 
against terrorism. – House Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Homeland Security, June 2004 
4. One of the few consistent findings in homeland security is that effective 
collaboration is the foundation of success.  Early lessons from both the 
Katrina and the Rita events suggest pre-event collaboration is also a 
significant determinant of effectiveness during the response and recovery 
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phases of incident management.  There is a need to understand how we 
can be more successful in our collaboration efforts.  Think about a specific 
homeland security (or related) effort that included at least two other 
agencies or organizations that you consider to have been a successful 
collaboration. Whenever possible, use an effort that was oriented to 
preparedness or prevention, not to response.  Write a brief narrative of the 
event, including the names of the primary organizations that were 
involved in the collaboration.  Rank order three key factors that 
contributed to the success of the collaboration (1 = most critical success 
factor).  Finally, provide a brief explanation about why the critical success 
factors mattered. 
5. Information sharing is one of the five core elements of the DHS 
prevention guidelines.  Reports from the 9/11 Commission, the Markle 
Foundation, and other groups point to the importance of appropriately 
sharing the right information with the right people and agencies.  The aim 
of this week's assignment is to identify factors that help and hinder 
information sharing among agencies and professions.  Select two 
examples from your experience: one example of successful information 
sharing and one example that illustrates the lack of effective sharing. What 
factors explain the success of the first example?  What factors account for 
the less successful second example? 
6. In March 2005, Secretary Chertoff said, "We need to adopt a risk-based 
approach in both our operations and our philosophy.  Risk management is 
fundamental to managing the threat, while retaining our quality of life and 
living in freedom.  Risk management must guide our decision-making as 
we examine how we can best organize to prevent, respond and recover 
from an attack.”  Risk assessment has been described as the study of 
vulnerabilities, threats, likelihood, and consequences.  It is also one of the 
first steps in the risk management process.  Prepare a brief memo to your 
boss explaining what a "risk-based approach" to homeland security means 
and how it can help or hinder your agency's work.  As a part of your 
memo, describe what a "risk assessment" is; use examples and language 
that are relevant to your agency or discipline. 
7. In Eugene Bardach's A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, he suggests 
that, “Rarely will you have any confidence that some helpful-looking 
practice is actually the ‘best’ among all those that are addressed to the 
same problem."  He suggests the term “smart practice,” because the 
activity being studied has something worth analyzing that is applicable to 
a problem.  Bardach further notes that "a practice is ... an expression of 
some underlying idea – an idea about how the actions entailed by the 
practice work to solve a problem or achieve a goal."
28
 The purpose of this 
assignment is to identify something that you consider to be a "smart 
practice" in homeland security.  Describe what the practice is, why you 
believe it merits the title "smart practice," and what the core idea is that is 
embodied in the practice.  You can look to your own experience for "smart 
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practice" ideas, or you can locate some examples on the DHS lessons 
learned website (https://www.llis.dhs.gov/).  
8. James McGregor Burns distinguished between transactional and 
transformational leadership.  In a recent survey of 243 California police 
chiefs and sheriffs, 94% of the respondents indicated that transformational 
leadership is needed to meet the challenges of homeland security. The 
study further notes "these law enforcement leaders were nearly unanimous 
in their belief that even though transformational leadership is required, 
very few practiced it."
29
 For this week's assignment, we would like you to 
identify ten principles or guidelines for a transformational homeland 
security leader.  At the end of your list, discuss how and why the 
principles are transformational rather than transactional. 
Second In-Residence Session 
Presentation of the strategy memo is the centerpiece of the second in-residence session. 
Students are asked to select a homeland security topic of interest and devise a strategy 
for the topic they identify.  The memos, developed during the non-residence period, are 
restricted to ten pages and assessed according to our program’s research paper guidelines.   
Students are given thirty minutes to brief their memo (using no more than three 
Power Point slides).  They have ten minutes to present, and twenty minutes to respond to 
questions.  To enhance the learning process, the students who are listening to the 
presentation provide a rigorous critique to the argument in the strategy memo.  
In addition each student provides an e-mail to the presenting student that identifies 
strengths and weaknesses of the briefing – for both content and style.  
A number of these strategy memos have been implemented by sponsor organizations.   
 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTRODUCTION COURSE 
Beyond continuously revising existing content, there are three areas where we are 
working to improve the course: 
1. Knowledge Gap Analysis:  Development of a questionnaire/survey of homeland 
security knowledge based on the NPS knowledge framework and competencies.  
Before the students start the Introduction course, we will ask them to complete the 
questionnaire.  Responses will identify participants’ “start states.”  The answers 
will be used to identify what they know, and more importantly their knowledge 
gaps.  This gap analysis will assist each student in developing an individual 
learning program.  At the end of the eighteen-month course of study, students will 
again complete the questionnaire to identify the significant, and positive, change. 
2. Program Integration: Better integrate the introductory material of each of the 
program’s courses into the Introduction course.  We plan to do this by expanding 
what we do online during the non-residence period. 
3. Expand the Role of Student Expertise:  Use wiki technology to have students – 
many of whom are already homeland security experts in a particular domain – 
serve as co-authors of the online homeland security content.  Wiki is an acronym 
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for "what I know is" and is a way to write collaboratively.  There are numerous 




The DHS-required external evaluation is a central feature of the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security master’s degree program.  It is the formal method we use to assess 
whether the Introduction course – and our curriculum – makes a difference. 
The students are asked by an independent evaluator to assess each course.  Instructors 
receive detailed quantitative and qualitative feedback on how well – over the three-month 
quarter – they achieved course objectives, reaction to the course readings, lectures, 
exercises, assignments, guests and other parts of the course.  That evaluation makes a 
foundational contribution to the continuous improvement we aim for. 
In addition to the formal evaluation results, we have noted four consistent outcomes 
of the Introduction course: 
1. Minds expand.  Participants learn that homeland security is more than they 
thought it was before they came into the program. 
2. Students learn “perspectives.”  They learn their discipline, agency, or level of 
government is not the center of the homeland security universe.  They learn the 
critical importance of interagency and interjurisdictional collaboration.  They 
and their colleagues really are in all of this together.  This outcome is one basis 
for our belief that homeland security can become an intellectual and 
professional discipline. 
3. The participants rediscover the nature of critical thinking, imagination, strategy 
and leadership. 
4. The participants start to create organizational, strategic, or policy change in their 
homeland security environment. 
When the Introduction course works the way we envision it should work, participants 
grow out of their old cognitive structures.  Many of them start to perceive themselves as 
homeland security leaders.  They acknowledge that they are directly responsible for what 
happens in this new professional and policy domain.  They stop being the audience.  
They begin to be the author of what happens next in homeland security. 
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1
The primary sources we reviewed were: National Research Council of the National Academies, 
Frameworks for Higher Education in Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 
2004); Unknown, Proposal for New Instructional Program: Master of Science - Homeland Security 
Leadership (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2005); Vincent Henry, Course Descriptions - 
Homeland Security Management Courses (New York: Long Island University, 2005); University of 
Connecticut, College of Continuing Studies, Master of Professional Studies - Homeland Security 
Leadership (http://continuingstudies.uconn.edu/onlinecourses/programs/homeland_security.html);  Stan 
Supinski, HLS/HLD -- Training and Education Spectrum (Battelle, 2006).  Department of Homeland 
Security, Multiple Fairways: Developing a Strategic Studies Program for the Department of Homeland 
Security (Conference Report Charting a Course for Homeland Security Strategic Studies, New London, 
Connecticut, 15-18 November, 2004); Jane A. Bullock, et al., Introduction to Homeland Security (New 
York: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2004); Mark A. Sauter and James Jay Carafano, Homeland 
Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 2005);  Robert W. Smith, “What Is ‘Homeland Security?’ Developing a Definition Grounded in the 
Curriculum," Journal of Public Affairs Education 11, no. 3 (2005): 233-46;  The National Academies 
report, Frameworks for Higher Education in Homeland Security, includes information about thirty-two 
homeland security education programs.  
2
The list is based on a review of the topics included in the Reference 1 sources.  The list was generated 
by counting the number of times a particular subject was mentioned as a primary topic (i.e., in a hierarchy 
of items, for example, the topic was at the top rather than at a subordinate level).  The first item on the list – 
“threats” – was mentioned by nine of the sources listed in Reference 1; the second item was mentioned 
eight times; items 3 through 7 were mentioned seven times; 8 through 12 received six mentions; 13 through 
16 were mentioned five times; items 17 through 26 were mentioned four times.  The remaining items 
received from one to three mentions. 
3
“Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for 
promoting progress in the … sciences…. [I]t is harmful to the growth of … science if administrative 
measures are used to impose one particular … school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right and 
wrong in … science should be settled through free discussion in … scientific circles and through practical 
work in these fields.  They should not be settled in an over-simple manner.” Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions among the People," in The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. V (Peking, 
China: Foreign Language Press, 1957),  http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-5/mswv5_58.htm.  Mao was talking about handling contradictions in a socialist society, but 
his point has relevance for homeland security – unlike Mao’s suggestion in the same commentary about 
what to do with people who disagree with mainstream ideas: “What should our policy be towards non-
Marxist ideas?” he asked.  “As far as unmistakable counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs of the socialist 
cause are concerned, the matter is easy, we simply deprive them of their freedom of speech.” 
4
National Research Council of the National Academies, "Frameworks for Higher Education in 
Homeland Security," p. 13-18 provides constructive ideas about potential approaches to homeland security 
education that may be appropriate for community colleges, undergraduate education, graduate education, 
and executive education. 
5
The Introduction course is co-taught by the authors.  The academic and professional backgrounds of 
the two instructors influence the course.  One instructor is a person with academic and practitioner 
experience.  The other instructor is a national leader in emergency management and homeland security.  
The mix of academic and practioner instructional perspectives affects the way the course material is 
selected and presented. 
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6
There frequently are discussions about the difference between homeland security training and 
education.  Several aphorisms illustrate the range of perspectives on the issue.  “There is no essential 
difference between training and education.”  “You train for the known, you educate for the unknown.”  
“Training is for shaping your mind so others can use it, education is for shaping your mind so you can use 
it.”  “Training that is done in the cognitive domain is generally at the knowledge level and lower part of the 
comprehension level.  Education … concentrates instead on the higher cognitive levels, i.e., high 
comprehension and above.”  Authors of the first three quotes are unknown.  The source of the last quote is 
John A. Kline, “Education and Training: Some Differences,” Air University Review, January-February 
1985, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/kline.html 
7
For a brief discussion of the distinction between these two terms see Doug Brent, "Teaching as 
Performance in the Electronic Classroom," in First Monday (2005) 
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_4/brent/index.html (accessed March 27, 2006). 
8
The classic statement of the andragogical philosophy is Malcolm Shepherd Knowles, The Adult 
Learner: A Neglected Species, 3rd ed. (Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Co., 1984). The andragogical model 
is used in the Introduction course; it is not used explicitly in all of the NPS/CHDS courses.  
9
Benjaman S. Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (New 
York: David McKay Co. Inc., 1956). The competencies are described later in this article.  They include 
history, terrorism, communication, threats, leadership, comparative governments, weapons of mass 
destruction, civil liberties, intelligence, analysis, technology, and strategy. 
10
 While the description could be applied to almost any leadership program, the specific and detailed 
homeland security linkages in this narrative emerge within each homeland security course. 
11
 Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education (New York: The Free Press, 1929). 
12
 For a copy of the most recent syllabus for the Introduction to Homeland Security course, please send 
an email request to cbellavi@nps.edu. 
13
 The initial evidence was presented in William V. Pelfrey, William D. Kelley, and John May, The 
Office for Domestic Preparedness Training Strategy, Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department 
of Justice (2003). 
14 
In this context, processes unique to homeland security include such activities as the National Incident 
Management System, National Response Plan, Target Capabilities List, etc. 
15
 The last time we taught the course, the Katrina response was still in its early days.  It was, obviously, 
a major topic for discussion and was readily incorporated into the Introduction course. 
16
 There are many variations of tabletop exercises.  At its most rudimentary, a tabletop exercise 
consists of people presented with a scenario; they are then asked, “What would you do if this happened?”  
There are, of course, more complex ways to conduct a tabletop. 
17
 See, for examples, the Kennedy School of Government case studies on “terrorism” at 
http://www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/. 
18
 For example, the October 2005 Baltimore Harbor Tunnel incident (see 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-te.md.threat19oct19,0,2973598.story?coll=bal-
attack-headlines) could be used as the basis for an exercise. 
19
 The notion of emergence we use in the exercise is described  in Steven Johnson, Emergence (New 
York: Touchstone, 2001), and in Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: The New Science of Networks 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing, 2002). 
20
 During the last Introduction course, the debate topic was the DHS 2006 homeland security grant 
allocation strategy. 
21
 For information about the Homeland Security Digital Library and how to gain access, please go to 
http://www.hsdl.org/. 
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22
 Each class session lasts four hours. 
23
 For a copy of the learning activities, please send an email request to cbellavi@nps.edu. 
24
 On this point, see Charles Perrow’s comment in his article in this issue of Homeland Security 
Affairs: “Coordination can be achieved through centralized control in small and moderately sized and 
homogeneous agencies, but mammoth projects [like homeland security] are almost impossible to 
coordinate through centralization.  Mammoth agencies require a great deal of decentralization because of 
the diverse tasks and skills involved.  Decentralized systems are coordinated not by giving central orders 
but by signaling intent and making sure that information is shared.” [Emphasis added.]   
25 
 One student followed the line of inquiry noted in this example, and ended up revising the homeland 
security strategy for his city. 
26
 During the non-residence session, we typically receive between forty and fifty posts a week to read.  
This takes six to seventeen hours a week to review, provide comments, and score. 
27
 The GAO document referred to in the assignment is United States General Accounting Office, 
Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,
(2004). 
28
 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving 2
nd
 ed. 9Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004), 91. 
29
 Patrick Miller, “How Can We Improve Information Sharing among Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies?” (master’s thesis, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2005). 
30
 The most prominent example is Wikipedia, at http://www.wikipedia.org/.  It is our intention to keep 
the wiki restricted to a comparative handful of students and selected other professionals since, as Nicholas 
Carr notes in his Law of the Wiki, “Output quality declines as the number of contributors increases.  
Making matters worse, the best contributors will tend to become more and more alienated as they watch 
their work get mucked up by the knuckleheads, and they'll eventually stop contributing altogether, leading 
to a further fall in quality.” http://www.roughtype.com/archives/2005/10/the_law_of_the.php 
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Abstract
A secure homeland is the nation’s first priority and is fundamental to the successful
execution of its military strategy. The U.S. military will continue to play a vital role
in securing the homeland through military missions overseas and by executing homeland
defense and civil support missions, and supporting emergency preparedness planning ac-
tivities. However, it is critical to understand the distinction between the role DOD plays
with respect to national security and the role of DHS as lead federal agency (LFA) for
Homeland Security (HLS), as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
With this paradigm in mind, this article describes the approach approved in the DOD-
HLS Joint Operating Concept (HLS JOC) that describes how DOD intends to perform its
responsibilities associated with securing the homeland, to include homeland defense and
civil support missions, and supporting emergency preparedness planning activities.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss is currently on the Strate-
gic Issues Team of the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels,
Belgium. Prior to this assignment, LTC Goss was a strategic planner in U.S. Northern
Command and was one of the main concept authors of the DOD Homeland Security Joint
Operating Concept. Mr. Barry Cardwell, L3 Communications, and Mr. Jimmie Perry-
man, CAS Incorporated, headed the writing team for the DOD HLS JOC and contributed
to this article.
KEYWORDS: DOD, military, HLD, HLS, USNORTHCOM
After the terror of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the world was revealed as a very dangerous 
place.  As a result, nearly everyone in America now agrees that it is the responsibility of the 
United States government to protect its citizens. However, questions over the division of 
responsibilities between federal and state officials and between various federal agencies in the 
current (post-9/11) strategic environment remain unresolved. In addressing this new threat 
environment of terrorism, the “Axis of Evil,” and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), the recent National Strategy for Combating Terrorism asserts “The 
struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in our history. We will 
not triumph solely or even primarily through military might.”1 President George W. Bush has 
identified the current struggle in Iraq as the “main front” in the war on terrorism, thus 
indicating the importance of the Department of Defense (DOD) responsibility for fighting 
trans-national groups like al Qaeda as “national security” threats.
The unprecedented nature of the current threat to the U.S., and the traditional role of the 
military in American society, raises challenges for homeland defense (HLD) and homeland 
security (HLS) planning in the current strategic environment. For military planners at United 
States Northern Command (and counter-terrorism planners at the Department of Homeland 
Security [DHS]), specific questions seem dominant: What exactly is the threat? What part of 
this threat is a “national security threat” or “foreign aggression” that is a DOD responsibility as 
part of the Homeland Defense mission? What is “homeland security” and what is the DOD role 
in homeland security? Until these questions are answered, military officers will struggle to 
clearly understand their role inside domestic society.
DOD took a step toward developing the answers to these questions when the new assistant 
secretary of defense for homeland defense developed the Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (June 2005) and U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) produced the DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (HLS 
JOC, February 2004). Work on these two documents by the new assistant secretary of defense 
for homeland defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Pacific Command, the Services, and the National 
Guard Bureau led to the development of a set of concepts to provide a framework for the 
military’s role internal to the U.S. What emerged was the concept that the delineation between 
homeland defense and homeland security is based on the simple question “who’s in charge?” 
The identity of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), rather than the specific threat or mission 
scenario, determines the role and responsibilities of the Department of Defense. Following this 
construct, DOD is the Lead Federal Agency for the homeland defense mission and has a 
supporting role in homeland security through its missions of civil support (also called Military 
Assistance to Civil Authorities [MACA] and Defense Support to Civil Authorities [DSCA]) 
and emergency preparedness.
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY CHALLENGES
As America moves into the twenty-first century, answering the question “what is the threat 
to the U.S. homeland?” presents a very complex problem for USNORTHCOM and DOD. The 
attacks of September 11 were not only a wake-up call, alerting the U.S. to a more dangerous 
world; they also triggered an immediate re-thinking of responses to terrorists and terrorism. 
The impressions of 9/11, and technological proliferation, have changed the strategic 
environment. This strategic uncertainty has also muddied the nation’s threat assessment by 
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painting groups like al Qaeda as both trans-national “national security threats” and as groups of 
terrorist criminals who could be “brought to justice.” In expressing the variety of threats facing 
the U.S., the current National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHLS) states: “Homeland 
security is focused on terrorism in the United States…Terrorists can be U.S. citizens or 
foreigners, acting in concert with others, on their own, or on behalf of a hostile state.”2
Statements like this define three main types of threats facing America today: a continuation of 
conventional military threats from hostile nation-states; traditional asymmetric threats from 
hostile states and state-sponsored political groups; and a new trans-national terrorist threat 
from ideological enemies. 
In assessing these diverse threats, the U.S is confronted with a spectrum of threats ranging 
from traditional national security threats (e.g. ballistic missile attack) to law enforcement 
threats (e.g. drug smuggling). Conceptually, this threat-environment mosaic is not a clear 
matrix of hostile states and non-state groups, but rather a threat “spectrum” – a range of hostile 
challenges from what Americans consider “war” to what most label as “crime” (See Figure 1). 
This is a conceptual spectrum with clear definitions at both ends and less clarity in the middle,
where the two ends blend together. At one end of the nation’s threat spectrum are types of 
threats that are clearly military in nature and are just as clearly DOD’s responsibility. These are 
traditional threats utilizing military capabilities from hostile and potentially hostile nation-
states. Examples include conventional military power and ballistic missile threats from “rogue 
states” and strategic threats from Russia and China. These threats are not new – they are well 
understood, with clear responsibilities within the federal government.
Just as clear to the federal government, and the American people, is the opposite end of the 
threat spectrum where threats are considered criminal in nature. These hostile actors include 
international criminal rings and narco-terrorists whose missions, motivations, and methods are 
criminal in nature rather than political or ideological. The law enforcement responsibilities for 
these types of threats are clear. The most dangerous of these groups, the narco-terrorists, are 
criminal in nature and there is normally no direct military involvement other than traditional 
military assistance and counter-drug support. On the periphery of this end of the spectrum are 
domestic terrorist groups, also dealt with as law enforcement concerns; DOD has little 
responsibility for these threats, except in the extreme and remote case of fighting insurrection 
against the government. Even declarations of a “war on drugs” have not changed the dynamic 
of who in the federal government is charged with countering these criminal acts, as evidenced 
by what happens when members of criminal drug cartels are captured, tried in a court of law, 
and imprisoned by the United States.
In the middle is a “seam” of ambiguity, where threats are neither clearly national security 
threats (requiring a military [DOD] response capability) nor clearly law enforcement threats 
(requiring a non-military response capability from the Department of Homeland Security 
[DHS], the Department of Justice [DOJ], or other agency).  Along this “seam” are threats such 
as transnational terrorist groups who challenge the delineation of responsibility between DOD 
and DHS, DOJ, or other agencies, because it is difficult to label them as either a national 
security threat or a law enforcement threat.  Determining whether a particular adversary is one 
or the other will depend on the circumstances at the time and who is most capable to lead the 
nation’s efforts.  Because of the nature of this spectrum, a coordinated, integrated, and coherent 
national effort is essential in securing the U.S. against all threats. 
This complexity and lack of certainty also challenge any attempt to divide possible hostile 
threat actors among various agencies with homeland defense and homeland security 
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responsibilities. The new types of threats are far more problematic for the traditional division 
of federal responsibilities – trans-national groups like al Qaeda and Hezbollah, some with state 
support and some that operate independently – that reside in the middle of the current threat 
spectrum where the American people cannot decide if the threat represents “war” or “crime.” 
But 9/11 and the Global War on Terror have compelled the American government to question 
whether these dangerous groups should be treated as national security threats and foreign 
aggression, implying a military responsibility, or whether they should be “brought to justice” 
by law enforcement authorities. 
In an effort to clarify responsibilities in countering these threats, the U.S. government after 
9/11 tried to reorganize to address concerns over these new emerging threats and the potential 
domestic use of the military. At the federal level, this is most apparent in the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and an increase in law enforcement powers with the 
USA PATRIOT Act. DHS was created specifically to address the threat of terrorism, bringing 
together twenty-two federal entities with critical homeland security missions into a single 
agency with the primary mission to protect our homeland against terrorist threats. In 
accordance with U.S. Federal Code, DOD’s primary mission, in contrast, has always been to 
use the nation’s military power and presence to deter aggression against U.S. interests and to 
defeat enemies should deterrence fail. Historically, this has been an overseas mission and in 
these forward regions, the role of the American military is clear.
While the traditional DOD role continues overseas, the American military has also been 
given expanded responsibility for some new threats the U.S. faces today. One of the main 
reasons for expanded DOD involvement, and the view that this new trans-national threat is 
different from traditional criminal terrorism, is the growing fear that the rapid proliferation of 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) technology 
has led to an increasing probability that these powerful weapons might be used in future 
terrorist attacks in what President Bush labels “the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”3
This expanded DOD responsibility, and its clearly legislated limits, are the strongest evidence 
available that these new trans-national threats are in the middle of the new threat spectrum and 
may or may not be a military threat.
For all these reasons, DOD adjusted its strategic focus after 9/11 (driven by expectations of 
the American people for security) to address not only a new emphasis on defeating threats 
overseas, but to prepare to defeat new asymmetric threats to the U.S. homeland. Because of the 
unique capabilities of the military, even before 9/11 Congress directed DOD to expand into 
new missions, including assisting with drug interdiction, protecting nuclear materials, and 
assisting with terrorist events involving WMD. As a check against mission creep and in 
recognition of cultural concerns over domestic use of the military, DOD involvement in these 
domestic missions requires invoking presidential authority and/or coordination between the 
attorney general and the secretary of defense over military missions and rules of engagement. 
The current embryonic nature of DHS and other agencies with counter-terrorism 
responsibilities and the demands of providing security for the American people only increase 
the potential for the president to turn to robust military capabilities during a crisis. 
Overlaying these DHS/Law Enforcement and DOD responsibilities on the current threat 
spectrum yields areas of overlap, both geographically and in mission orientation, because the 
trans-national threats in the middle of the spectrum pose a new challenge for the federal 
government. While robust DOD capabilities face historical resistance to their use in domestic 
operations, even more problems exist for law enforcement and DHS because of the fear that 
3Goss: DOD Challenges in HLD / HLS
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
threat capabilities have grown faster than the required legal authorities and operational 
abilities. The Department of Justice, (DOJ), DHS, and state and city governments are still 
developing required operational counter-terrorism and WMD defensive capabilities. Many 
state and local law enforcement agencies could potentially be overwhelmed in a direct attack 
by a terrorist cell using military weapons and paramilitary tactics. This capability shortfall was 
identified even before 9/11 when the federal Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of 
Operations Plan recognized that no “single federal, state, or local government agency has the 
capability or requisite authority to respond independently” to terrorist threats or attacks.4
When the absence of a clear delineation between military and non-military responsibilities is 
added to the concern over potential terrorist use of WMD, national leaders naturally want to 
use every asset available – including military capabilities – because of the threat and the 
magnitude of the danger.
This absence of clear lines of responsibility for terrorist threats is not unique to this aspect 
of American government. The current National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes this 
by defining HLS as a “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks…” where the 
“concerted national effort” is based on “the principles of shared responsibility and partnership” 
among various federal, state, and local agencies and with the American people.5 The current 
overlap of DHS and DOD’s domestic roles in the war on terrorism may be a positive 
development. This duplication presents the federal government with options, both military and 
non-military, during a crisis to address each specific threat (See Figure 1). Under existing 
legislation or the president’s constitutional authority, DOD may be directed to move against 
specific threats to the United States or against any threatened use of a weapon of mass 
destruction. 
Figure 1: Current National Challenge
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This absence of a clearly defined border between DOD and DHS, DOJ, or other agency 
responsibilities, and the overlap of capabilities, is in reality an inherent strength for the federal 
government; it allows the president to determine which threats are best met by law 
enforcement and which require military response.  This absence of clear lines of responsibility 
in the “seam” between “war” and “crime” is also an enabler for DOD because in most cases it 
will limit military involvement in law enforcement and allow DOD to focus on warfighting 
responsibilities. In this way, the overlap of DHS, DOJ, or other federal agency and DOD’s 
domestic role in the homeland supports the national strategy by providing the federal 
government with military and non-military options to address a specific threat. 
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND  SECURITY PARADIGM
A secure homeland is the nation’s first priority and is fundamental to the successful 
execution of the nation’s military strategy.  It is also essential to America’s ability to project 
power, sustain a global military presence, and to honor its global security commitments.  The 
military will continue to play a vital role in securing U.S. territory through the execution of 
homeland defense and civil support missions, as well as emergency preparedness planning 
activities (as defined in Figure 2).  As shown in Figures 2 and 3, HLS is not synonymous with 
HLD, nor are HLD, Civil Support (CS), and Emergency Preparedness (EP) subordinate to 
HLS.  On the contrary, while HLS (as defined in the NSHLS) is concerned with preventing and 
mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks, DOD’s concern cannot be limited to terrorists.  DOD 
must prepare for conventional or unconventional attacks by any adversary (including, but not 
strictly limited to, terrorists).  When DOD conducts military missions to defend the people or 
territory of the United States at the direction of the president, this is homeland defense.
Figure 2: DOD-HLS Paradigm from Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept
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As with military missions abroad, DOD is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for HLD, with 
other departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts.  Circumstances in which DOD 
supports the broader efforts of the federal, state, and/or local government, as coordinated by 
and in cooperation with the DHS or another agency as LFA, are appropriately described as 
Civil Support.
Figure 3: Clarifying the DOD HLS Paradigm with Examples
In these cases, DHS (or another LFA) coordinates activities and DOD is prepared to 
support the plans that are developed.  In the same way that some aspects of HLD are unrelated 
to HLS, some aspects of DOD’s civil support functions are unrelated to terrorism and do not 
fall under HLS, yet DOD can still provide other unique capabilities in support of civilian 
authorities (for example, support for natural disaster relief).  Similarly, some aspects of HLS 
fall outside the purview of DOD.  These functions (such as airport security measures enacted 
by the Transportation Security Administration [TSA]), fall under the lead of DHS (or another 
LFA).  Where a particular scenario or incident falls within this paradigm is not for DOD (or 
DHS) to decide.  As shown in Figure 4, this responsibility rests with the president as 
commander in chief and chief executive.  
In many cases, the answer is unequivocal.  In clear cases of foreign aggression and threats 
to national security, DOD will be directed to conduct HLD operations necessary to defeat an 
attack (including, if applicable, actions taken in anticipatory self-defense to preempt an attack 
before it takes place).  In cases with clear law enforcement responsibility, the president will 
direct DHS, DOJ, or another agency to assume LFA responsibility for HLS, and DOD may or 
may not be directed to perform a supporting role.  It is also possible for the president to direct 
the transition of LFA responsibility during a crisis from DOD to another federal agency, or 
vice versa, should changing circumstances warrant such a transition (for example, if law 
enforcement capabilities are unexpectedly exceeded).
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Figure 4: DOD HLS Paradigm Seams and Transitions
Determining LFA responsibility in situations that are neither clearly military nor clearly 
law enforcement is a complex challenge, especially in time-sensitive situations. In those 
situations where DOD and DHS, DOJ, or another on-scene agency have the required 
capabilities, but lack a formal presidential directive, the on-scene leadership must be 
empowered to take whatever actions are deemed necessary and appropriate, in accordance with 
pre-established authorities, guidance, and policies, to ensure the security of the homeland.
THE ROLE OF DOD IN THE HOMELAND
The most important purpose and highest priority for DOD is the defense of the homeland 
against external threats and foreign aggression.  In this core mission, DOD is responsible for 
deterring attacks against the U.S., its territories, and possessions.  Should deterrence fail, DOD 
requires a defense that is proactive, externally focused, and conducted in depth beginning at the 
source of the threat.  Realizing that the first line of defense is performed overseas through 
traditional and special military operations to stop potential threats before they can directly 
threaten the homeland, but that not all potential threats can be prevented, a Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities that embraces a layered defense is 
required.  The transit of threats to the homeland from their source to their target presents DOD
with a series of opportunities to detect, deter, prevent, or defeat the threat and avoid the 
requirement to mitigate its effects.  While DOD will require capabilities to detect and defeat 
external threats and aggression anywhere in the world, DOD’s goal will continue to be to 
defeat threats as far from the Homeland as possible. 
In the United States, there are three circumstances6 that govern DOD involvement in 
homeland defense, civil support operations and emergency preparedness planning:
7Goss: DOD Challenges in HLD / HLS
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
1. In extraordinary circumstances, DOD would conduct military missions such as 
ballistic missile defense (BMD), combat air patrols, or maritime defense operations 
as the lead in defending the people and the territory of the U.S., supported by other 
agencies.  Included in this category are cases in which the president, exercising 
constitutional authority as commander-in-chief and the chief executive, authorizes 
military actions to counter threats within the U.S., as well as steady-state operations 
in which DOD is preparing and/or posturing for extraordinary circumstances.  
2. In emergency circumstances, such as responding to an attack or to catastrophic 
events (for example, forest fires, floods, hurricanes, or tornadoes), DOD could be 
directed to act quickly to provide capabilities that other agencies do not possess or 
that have been exhausted or overwhelmed.  In such circumstances, other federal 
agencies take the lead and DOD provides support.
3. In limited-scope missions, such as special events, like the Olympics, or special 
projects such as assisting other federal agencies to develop capabilities to detect
chemical and biological agents, other agencies have the lead and DOD supports. 
These three circumstances are neither mutually exclusive nor static.  At any given time, 
DOD could be conducting multiple operations concurrently under some or all of these 
circumstances.  Furthermore, any number of potential scenarios could necessitate a transition 
among the circumstances (for example, transitioning from a “limited scope” mission to 
“emergency circumstances” after a terrorist attack at a special event). DOD must plan for and 
be able to simultaneously defend the homeland, provide support to civil authorities as directed, 
and help prepare for national security emergencies.  By so doing, DOD helps preserve the 
nation’s freedom of action and ensures the ability of the U.S. to project and sustain power 
wherever and whenever it chooses.  DOD’s responsibilities for securing the homeland fall into 
three areas: homeland defense, civil support operations, and emergency preparedness planning 
activities.
Homeland Defense (HLD): the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, 
and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression (DPG 04 and Draft Joint Pub 
3.26).
HLD operations ensure the integrity and security of the United States by detecting, 
deterring, preventing, and defeating threats and aggression against the U.S. as early and as far 
from its borders as possible so as to minimize their effects on U.S. society and interests.7  This 
defense must be proactive, externally focused, and conducted in-depth by layering integrated 
military, interagency and multi-national partner capabilities beginning at the source of the 
threat.  The mission sets for HLD include the following:
• Air Defense: includes all measures taken to deter, detect, or destroy hostile air 
threats against the U.S. homeland. Air defenses are designed to destroy, nullify, or 
reduce the effectiveness of attacking adversary aircraft, and manned and unmanned 
missiles.
• Land Defense: includes homeland defense operations taken under extraordinary 
circumstances to deter and, if necessary, defeat land threats when the president 
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directs or SECDEF orders. Although the threat of a full-scale land invasion by a 
hostile power is remote, when directed by the president ground forces may be 
employed to conduct offensive operations and establish active and passive defenses 
in depth to counter a host of conventional and asymmetric threats.
• Maritime Defense: includes homeland defense operations undertaken to detect, 
deter, defeat, or nullify maritime threats against U.S. territory, domestic population 
and infrastructure. A full-scale maritime invasion of the United States is also 
unlikely, but when directed by the president maritime forces may be employed to 
conduct offensive operations and active and passive defenses in-depth to counter 
maritime attacks within U.S. territorial waters.
• Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): BMD is a supporting homeland defense mission 
and its capabilities are designed to detect, deter, defend against, and defeat 
adversary ballistic missile threats. BMD of the homeland includes the integration of 
capabilities to destroy or disrupt adversary missiles in flight or prior to launch. 
BMD consists of sensors, weapons, command and control, manning, and logistic 
systems, which are employed collectively.
Civil Support (CS): DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for 
designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called Military Assistance to Civil 
Authorities or MACA (DPG 04 and Draft Joint Pub 3.26).
In addition, DOD may be directed to assist civilian authorities in order to save lives, protect 
property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe.  DOD 
maintains many unique capabilities that can be used to mitigate and manage the consequences 
of both natural and man-made disasters, and must be prepared to provide support to state and 
local authorities, if requested by the LFA.  The president and the secretary of defense 
determine priorities regarding what DOD resources will be made available for civil support.  
This civil support mission, also known as Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), is 
the broad mission consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, 
military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for civil 
disturbances.8 The mission sets for civil support include:
• Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA): a mission of civil support 
consisting of support for natural or man-made disasters, chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence management, and other 
support as required.
• Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA): a mission 
of civil support that includes support to civilian law enforcement agencies. This 
includes but is not limited to: combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, 
national security special events, and national critical infrastructure and key asset 
protection.
• Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS): a mission set of civil 
support involving DOD support, normally based on the direction of the president, to 
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suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence, and provide federal 
supplemental assistance to the states to maintain law and order.
Emergency Preparedness (EP): those planning activities undertaken to ensure DOD 
processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the president and secretary of 
defense in a designated national security emergency (DPG 04).
In addition to the homeland defense and civil support missions, DOD has certain 
responsibilities to help prepare for emergencies.  These responsibilities fall into one of three 
mission sets for emergency preparedness:
• Continuity of Operations (COOP): the degree or state of being continuous in the 
conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or 
mission in carrying out the national military strategy.  COOP includes the functions 
and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties 
performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the 
commander.
• Continuity of Government (COG): a coordinated effort within each branch 
(executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue minimum 
essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency.  COG 
activities involve ensuring the continuity of minimum essential branch functions 
through plans and procedures governing succession to office and the emergency 
delegation of authority (when and where permissible and in accordance with 
applicable laws); the safekeeping of vital resources, facilities, and records; the 
improvisation of emergency acquisition of vital resources necessary for the 
continued performance of minimum essential functions; the capability to relocate 
essential personnel and functions to alternate work sites and to reasonably sustain 
the performance of minimum essential functions at the alternate work site until 
normal operations can be resumed.  COG is dependent upon effective COOP plans 
and capabilities.
• Other Emergency Preparedness roles: in addition to COOP and COG, if the 
president directs, DOD may be tasked with additional missions relating to 
emergency preparedness.
 CONCLUSION
The implication drawn from this review of the DOD-HLS paradigm and the traditional role 
of DOD in domestic operations is that DOD has a near-monopoly of responsibility for 
homeland defense. For homeland security, DOD’s role consists of civil support and emergency 
preparedness. There is a military component in HLS, just not at the federal level. The National 
Guard is organized, trained, and equipped by the Department of Defense, and when federalized 
in a Title 10 status can conduct traditional DOD missions such as homeland defense or civil 
support.  Additionally, the National Guard in state or Title 32 status possesses many of the 
attributes required of an effective joint force, yet remains responsive to state sovereign 
authorities free of the limitations that constrain federal forces such as Posse Comitatus.  This 
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provides the capability to execute a synchronized military response in those HLS areas where 
DOD Title 10 forces may not be the most effective response. By conducting HLS missions 
under state control, the use of these National Guard forces helps bridge the gap and facilitates 
operations in the “seam.”
The shared responsibility for the terrorist threat makes it challenging for U.S. Northern 
Command and others in DOD to structure clear responsibilities based on threat scenarios 
because of the expectations that both military and non-military planners will address the 
current trans-national terrorist threat – regardless of the legislated responsibilities of each 
component. This overlap between DOD and non-military agencies will continue unless the 
American electorate decides that either law enforcement capabilities will expand into this 
domain or military authorities will be assigned a greater domestic role. Both potential solutions 
have significant challenges and may well be decided based upon reactions to future terrorist 
actions. Another 9/11-type terrorist attack inside the United States – especially one involving 
weapons of mass destruction – may propel the military into increased domestic responsibilities
to protect the U.S. and mitigate the fears of the American people.
The implications of the spectrum of threats ranging from “war” to “crime” will continue to 
challenge the implementation of the current Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense 
Support to Civil Authorities and resulting homeland defense and civil support missions and 
emergency preparedness activities, especially until policies, procedures, statutes, and legal 
authorities are clarified through legislative and/or executive action.  In the interim, DOD must 
be capable of operating against adversaries in the “seam,” should the president so direct.  For 
example, under existing legislation, or the president’s constitutional authority, DOD may be 
directed to move against specific threats to the United States or against any threatened use of a 
weapon of mass destruction.  As the current National Security Strategy concludes, “To defeat 
this [terrorist] threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better 
homeland defense, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist 
financing.”9  Though the current response to this national challenge may create overlap and 
redundancy in capabilities between DOD and its interagency partners, maintaining this “seam” 
will serve to prevent gaps in government-wide counter-terrorism capabilities and will continue 
to provide the president the flexibility to confront adversaries across the threat spectrum.
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THE DISASTER AFTER 9/11: THE DEPARTMENT OF 







September 11, 2001 presented a challenge to our government that went way beyond 
any challenges that natural disasters had presented in decades. The terrorist attack 
suggested possible future ones that would involve more of society than a natural 
disaster might, and we had few institutional structures to cope with it. Our last major 
effort was President Jimmy Carter’s amalgamation of agencies to form the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), but it was small and its terrorist concerns 
were limited to threats from domestic political radicals.1 Something far beyond the 
recombination of disaster agencies that produced FEMA was needed. 
The first thing required was a change in the mental model that our top officials in 
the White House were using to address threats to the nation. Years of preoccupation 
with state-sponsored threats of nuclear missile attacks would be hard to set aside.  
Second, we needed a new institutional capacity for dealing with the new terrorist 
threat. Should this capacity reside primarily in the White House, or in Congress? 
Without a convincing change in its threat model, the White House, I argue, was unable 
to mobilize support for allowing it to control the effort, and control passed to Congress 
But so many interests were impacted by such a huge project that it became unwieldy. 
Furthermore, the institutional framework chosen for protecting homeland security 
followed a cultural script that organizational designers such as Congress most easily 
revert to – namely, centralized control – even though the problem would be more 
amenable to the empowerment of diverse, decentralized units, with central 
coordination rather than central control. The many organizational difficulties we will 
examine that flowed from the central control format, coupled with distracting wars and 
lack of urgency, make the failure of the reorganization seem almost inevitable.  
 Finally, the same format was used to attempt a restructuring of the intelligence 
agencies and once again powerful interests, this time in the Pentagon as well as 
Congress, appear to have thwarted this effort as well. Compared to our restructuring 
response to the 9/11 tragedy, the creation and shaky evolution of FEMA thirty-five 
years ago, for all its problems, begin to look like a piece of cake.   
   
THE THREAT MODEL 
Why was the administration of George W. Bush so unprepared for a terrorist attack 
upon our homeland?  The answer to this question is one part of the explanation for the 
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dismal performance of the Department of Homeland Security. (The other part of the 
answer is that we expect too much of our organizations and the matter of predictable 
organizational failures, which we will come to later.)  
 It is a truism that the military is always prepared to fight the last war. Given the 
difficulty of predicting which adversary will strike next and how it will strike, this may 
be the best the military can do. There are many conditions that will reinforce a similar 
mind set, or world view, in other areas of life, when we live for decades under the 
threat of foreign attack. All our major institutions, not just the military and diplomatic 
corps, become firmly configured to meet this threat. The political area develops scripts 
and slogans to mobilize defense; a candidate or party cannot be weak on defense. Parts 
of business and industry thrive on defense expenditures and gain more power than 
those parts that are hurt by defense expenditures. The media builds appropriate 
images of heroes and villains; the judicial system and social institutions such as 
education are altered to reflect the world view. (Early in the Cold War, university 
Russian Studies programs were quickly staffed with faculty without PhDs, contrary to 
university policy; Black Studies programs had a hard time getting started when they 
came along because they recruited faculty without PhDs, which was declared to be 
contrary to university policy.) A Cold War that ran for some four decades can build up 
an impressive institutional support system confident that the next engagement will be 
similar to those anticipated for the last four decades. Many ways of life are elaborately, 
and sometimes comfortably, built around this sensible hypothesis.   
 But it was beginning to erode in the 1990s, when no obvious enemy nation was 
apparent after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since institutions, by their nature, 
change slowly and reluctantly, there remained a physical, organizational, and 
ideological infrastructure that could be mobilized by any president who argued that we 
remained threatened by foreign states.   
 Even events that challenge the lingering world view need not shake it. The U.S. was 
repeatedly attacked by terrorists with no apparent state support in the 1980s and 
1990s, sometimes on its own homeland. By the mid-1980s al Qaeda, a terrorist 
organization not supported by a foreign state, was identified as a serious threat to our 
security at home. The Soviet Union had collapsed in 1989, and there was irrefutable 
evidence that the U.S. was the only superpower left. But this did not prompt any 
adjustment in our defense strategy, even after the first Twin Towers attack in 1993 was 
laid at the door of terrorists not sent by a foreign state.    
 Regardless of our superpower status, the mind-set and the associated institutional 
direction led the Bush administration, soon after 9/11, to place something as difficult 
and expensive as an expansion of a missile defense system on a high priority list. In 
keeping with this, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were declared an “axis of evil” requiring 
a conventional military buildup on our part, while counter-terrorism funds 
appropriated under President Clinton were actually cut. This was not a case of 
institutional lethargy or drift, or even maintaining a steady state. Compared to the two 
previous administrations, the new administration vigorously reinstated and 
refurbished the subsiding Cold War ideology. It was a trajectory, built upon a mind set 
that had powerful institutional traditions.  These can be mobilized. (For evidence of 
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the Cold War ideology, see former CIA Bin Laden unit head Michael Scheuer’s 
Imperial Hubris.2)  
 Our vulnerabilities, in the administration’s eyes, were not symbolic, crowded 
skyscrapers like the Twin Towers, or the hearts of the beast, the Pentagon (attacked on 
9/11) and the White House (almost attacked). The administration saw our 
vulnerabilities as the thousands of miles of open skies through which a nuclear missile 
could fly from a ship at sea that only North Korea was remotely able to launch. This 
vision is also a way of not seeing.  
 
FAILED WARNINGS 
Before 9/11, the administration virtually ignored numerous warnings about our lack of 
preparedness for terrorist attacks. They came from two independent commissions, 
security experts such as Richard Clarke and Rand Beers, and members of the 
intelligence transition team who advised the new administration that further attacks 
on our soil were quite possible. (We had been repeatedly attacked abroad, in 
coordinated attacks upon two of our African embassies, our base in Saudi Arabia, the 
U.S.S. Cole, and at home, in the first attack upon the Twin Towers in NYC.) As late as 
March 2004 the White House was continuing to say that it had made counterterrorism 
its top priority upon coming into office in January 2001. For example White House 
spokesman Scott McClellan, echoing similar comments from top Administration 
officials, said that "this Administration made going after al Qaeda a top priority from 
very early on," according to a press briefing on March 22, 2004.    
 But the White House admitted that in the face of increased terror warnings before 
9/11 it only once convened its task force on counterterrorism before 9/11. President 
Bush himself admitted that he "didn't feel the sense of urgency" about terrorism before 
9/11, despite repeated warnings that al Qaeda could be planning to hijack airplanes 
and use them as missiles.3 This negligence came at roughly the same time that the vice 
president held at least ten meetings of his Energy Task Force and attended at least six 
meetings with Enron executives, presumably more pressing business than convening 
the task force.  
 Similarly, Newsweek reported that internal government documents disclosed that, 
before 9/11, the Bush Administration moved to "de-emphasize" counterterrorism. As 
one of many pieces of evidence Newsweek notes that when "FBI officials sought to add 
hundreds more counterintelligence agents" to deal with the problem, "they got shot 
down" by the White House.4 The very day before the 9/11 attack, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft rejected an increase of fifty-eight million dollars the FBI requested to 
finance 149 new counterterrorism agents, 200 analysts, and fifty-four more 
translators. He also proposed that a Department of Justice program designed to 
provide equipment and training for first responders in the event of a terrorist attack be 
cut by sixty-five million dollars.5 The president’s national security leadership met 
formally nearly 100 times in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, yet 
terrorism was the topic during only two of those sessions. Richard Clarke’s "urgent" 
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memo asking for a meeting of top officials on the imminent al Qaeda threat was not 
acted upon for almost eight months.   
 Finally, the White House threatened to veto efforts putting more money into 
counterterrorism, tried to cut funding for counterterrorism grants, delayed arming the 
unmanned airplanes that had spotted Bin Laden in Afghanistan, and terminated a 
highly classified program to monitor al Qaeda suspects in the United States. Many of 
these failures are cited by the report of the 9/11 Commission, but one surprising 
admission did not make it into the report: Scott McClellan, while saying al Qaeda was a 
top priority from the beginning, in the same press briefing on March 22, 2004 
mentioned a previously forgotten report from April 2001 (four months before 9/11) 
that shows the Bush Administration officially declared it "a mistake" to focus "so much 
energy on Osama bin Laden."6 Even when warned of imminent attacks in August of 
2001, President Bush did not say “this is very serious; I want daily briefings on this and 
let the other relevant agencies know how seriously this must be taken.” Instead, he told 
the 9/11 Commission that he was “heartened” to learn that seventy full field office 
investigations were underway, and presumably that would take care of things and was 
the end of the matter.7   
 In contrast, in 1999, fearing a “millennium” attack (with much less evidence than 
we had in the months prior to 9/11), President Clinton shared his Presidential Daily 
Briefings with up to twenty-five people (while President Bush limited it to six), 
activated resources abroad, foiling some attacks, and activated resources at home. 
Airlines and airports were kept on alert, the border guards alerted, and one terrorist 
was apprehended and linked to Al Qaeda.8 At least some dots were connected as a 
result of attention from the White House.   
  A flurry of documents, including White House press releases dug up by the press 
and critics of the administration and released in the spring of 2004, indicated that 
immediately after the 9/11 attack there were three major initiatives by the White 
House. The first was an invasion of Afghanistan, to destroy bin Laden’s base and 
training ground; next was preparation for an invasion of Iraq, which had been on the 
agenda since the Bush administration took office in January 2001, according to many 
commentators. Protection from terrorist attacks here in the U.S. was a distant third.  
Even the pursuit of bin Laden in Afghanistan was not aggressive.   
 The concern with terrorism after 9/11 seemed eerily distant.  Journalist Dana 
Milbank reported:  
In the early days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush White House cut by  
nearly two-thirds an emergency request for counterterrorism funds by the FBI, an 
internal administration budget document shows. The document, dated October 12, 
2001, shows that the FBI requested $1.5 billion in additional funds to enhance its 
counterterrorism efforts with the creation of 2,024 positions. But the White House 
Office of Management and Budget cut that request to $531 million. Attorney General 
John D. Ashcroft, working within the White House limits, cut the FBI's request for 
items such as computer networking and foreign language intercepts by half, cut a 
cyber-security request by three quarters and eliminated entirely a request for 
‘collaborative capabilities.’9   
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This background sets the stage for the homeland defense initiative that eventually 
resulted in the Department of Homeland Security. Despite the politically powerful 
rhetoric of the president and the White House about “eliminating” the terrorist threat, 
it was not high on the agenda. In the first nine months after 9/11, the invasion of 
Afghanistan was planned and carried out, planning for an Iraq invasion stepped up, 
and massive tax cuts for the wealthy moved forward, but only a small office of fifty or 
so professionals was set up in the White House to deal with homeland security. This 
gave Congress, and especially the Democrats, the chance eventually to foster a 
response in their own terms.   
 
The Homeland Defense First Option: White House Control 
Political scientist Charles Wise lays out three options available to the government to 
cope with the threat to homeland security. The threat was acknowledged years before 
9/11, of course, and the three options had been considered in various governmental 
reviews and task forces. Wise labels the option first undertaken by President Bush in 
the month after the attack as “executive order coordination.” 10  
 This option was to coordinate and stimulate homeland defense from the White 
House by establishing an Office of Homeland Security and appointing an assistant to 
the president to run it (Tom Ridge, former governor of Pennsylvania, and widely 
respected). While this might suggest a minimalist response, as compared to the new 
Department of Homeland Security that we eventually got, it was in many respects the 
most promising option, since it emphasized coordination rather than centralization. It 
had the advantages of rapid response and flexibility and would give the president more 
direct authority than he or she would have with a Department of Homeland Security, 
which gave much control to Congress. But while it was in place, from October 2001 to 
July 2002, it had an uncertain status and achieved little. As noted, the White House 
was cutting terrorist-related funds a month after 9/11.    
 This option, a White House Office, would require exceptional activism from the 
White House, whereas a Department would not. The presidential assistant for 
homeland security would have to be strongly supported by the president in struggles 
with the Office of Management and Budget to reallocate funds, and in struggles with 
the all-important intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI, who were not 
sharing information. For example, using the threat of personnel replacements and 
budget cuts, the assistant would have to demand concrete evidence that the FBI 
changed it priorities from catching and prosecuting criminals, especially the purveyors 
of illicit drugs (its top priority), to investigating terrorist activity and sharing 
information with the CIA.  
 It is true there are laws on the books governing Cabinet bureaus and congressional 
actions that would prevent the president or the head of the Office of Homeland 
Security from running roughshod over them, but presidents have been able to do a 
great deal despite these laws.11 The theme of the “imperial presidency” mobilizing 
political and economic resources is a strong one in our history.       
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 Executive order coordination has the virtue of preserving the decentralized 
structure of the many agencies involved, but adding a measure of direction that can 
promote coordination. Decentralization does not mean fragmentation. Fragmentation 
comes when decentralized units do not receive explicit policy direction nor the general 
oversight that indicates the policy is being carried out, and do not share information. 
The overwhelming problem with our homeland security and defense was a failure to 
coordinate, to “connect the dots” as we heard endlessly. Coordination can be achieved 
through centralized control in small and moderately sized and homogeneous agencies, 
but mammoth projects are almost impossible to coordinate through centralization. 
Mammoth agencies require a great deal of decentralization because of the diverse tasks 
and skills involved. Decentralized systems are coordinated not by giving central orders 
but by signaling intent and making sure that information is shared.      
 What, concretely, would this mean in terms of executive action? I am sure the FBI 
director, Robert Mueller, appointed just prior to 9/11, and by all accounts more 
motivated and effective than any of his recent predecessors, can testify that changing 
an organization’s “culture” is a tough job. But while the task is difficult, that is what 
administrators are paid for. Unfortunately, there was no great reallocation of 
personnel from drug interdiction and prosecuting to, say, translating intercepts and 
documents, huge amounts of which remained untranslated over three years later. With 
“executive order coordination” the assistant could demand that personnel be rotated 
between the FBI and the CIA. This had been “ordered” during the Clinton 
administration but no one followed up so it did not happen. Following up would be the 
job of the assistant, and it would not require a platoon of staffers.   
 For example, the FBI’s top management would have to show evidence that they 
took seriously and investigated the complaints of FBI translator Sibel Edmonds. She 
wrote superiors that she was ordered to slow up her productivity in order to justify a 
bigger budget request for the translation department, and that favoritism had led to 
hiring a translator who had not only failed to translate messages in Arabic languages 
accurately, but was married to a man who was on the terrorist watch list.  (They both 
left the U.S. immediately after the 9/11 attack.) FBI management dismissed her 
charges and instead promoted her supervisor and his two superiors, and fired 
Edmonds.12 Strong signals from the assistant for homeland security would make it 
clear that investigating such complaints, and there were many, instead of promoting 
the individuals charged, would be rewarded.   
 Or, to take another illustration of the type of effort required, consider the so-called 
“firewall” erected in 1995 that supposedly restricted information sharing between the 
FBI and the CIA. The Report of the 9/11 Commission notes this was the result of the 
“misinterpretation” of judicial rulings and procedures. The FBI conveniently saw these 
as prohibiting information sharing, and the Clinton administration did not address the 
problem, even though they were warned about it in 1999. (Still, in two crises, 
information was shared in the Clinton administration.) But the Bush administration 
received strong warnings in 2000 and 2001 that intelligence agencies were not sharing 
data, and that the intent of the 1995 procedures was ignored routinely.13 These 
warnings came at a time of higher threat levels than the previous administration had 
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experienced, but still had no effect upon the Bush Administration. (Moreover,  the 
forty or so warnings in 2000 about al Qaeda in the Presidential Daily Briefings – a 
much higher threat level than in 1999 – appeared to have no effect.)  These warnings of 
misinterpretations could be addressed by a homeland security assistant who was fully 
empowered by the president and his top staff. It was front page news that the FBI was 
not changing its procedures. In fact, its several attempts to prosecute suspected 
terrorists were thrown out of court because of faulty procedures, in contrast to its very 
successful cases against the terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. 
Redirecting the FBI was certainly not a “slam dunk,” but it is far from impossible. 
FEMA has been redirected at least three times by various White Houses.   
 In his dramatic memoir Against all Enemies, Richard Clarke indicates that the 
initial plan of President Bush might have worked.14 It envisioned Tom Ridge heading 
up a White House Homeland Security staff of about fifty professionals to lead, 
coordinate, and conduct oversight of the many federal programs involved with security 
and disasters. As assistant to the president for homeland security, Ridge expected to 
have real authority, but soon complained everything had to be cleared with the White 
House chief of staff. (Presumably that meant homeland security had to be politically 
vetted, making it less than the top priority of the president.) While this was still 
consistent with presidential control of the program, it revealed that the president did 
not intend to take the domestic security issue seriously enough to deal directly with 
Ridge.  
 This was not a good sign, but the Office might have worked had the president given 
it a high priority. Clarke observes: “I believe that adept White House coordination and 
leadership could get the many agencies all working on components of a consistent 
overall program.” It would be difficult, of course, but over the years his own 
organization, the National Security Council, had managed to be quite effective during 
the Clinton Administration. He continues: “… the alternative method, rewiring the 
organizational boxes, would make us less able to deal with domestic security and 
preparedness for years to come.”15 It had taken years for the mergers that created the 
Energy Department and the Transportation Department to gel, and both were smaller. 
Ridge apparently agreed with Clarke that the last thing needed was the reorganization 
involved in creating a new department.    
 Executive order coordination was the option that President Bush maintained 
without much enthusiasm from October 2001 until July of 2002. This lack of 
enthusiasm was important; it opened the door to other interests. 
 
 
The Second Option: Power Sharing   
In the second option, what Wise calls the “statutory coordinator” option, the homeland 
security agency is established by law, rather than presidential order. Laws are passed 
by Congress, so this gives Congress more power than under the first option, and thus 
reduces that of the president. This was proposed by the Gilmore Commission, which 
was considering these matters well before 9/11, having been formed in 1999. (Its 
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official government title was, alas, The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.) Despite 
commissions like this before 9/11, aside from a counter-terrorism group in the White 
House, little was done in the way of government reorganization. The Gilmore 
Commission had examined all efforts in its second annual report in December 2000 
and concluded: “The organization of the federal government’s programs for combating 
terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable.” The problem, 
it said, was lack of central authority, a routine and easy recommendation to which 
commissions are prone. “The lack of a national strategy is inextricably linked to the 
fact that no entity has the authority to direct all of the entities that may be engaged.”16  
It called for a national office for combating terrorism that would have legal – that is, 
statutory – authority and be located in the Executive Office of the President. This 
location gives the president considerable authority, but it is shared with Congress, 
which writes the laws governing it.   
 The reasoning of the Commission was that oversight responsibilities for combating 
terrorism presently lay in the hands of at least eleven full committees in the Senate, 
plus numerous subcommittees, and fourteen full committees in the House, with all 
their subcommittees, eighty-eight in all, each carefully guarding its turf.17 It was the 
same problem that earlier commissions had identified for FEMA. The homeland 
security effort had to be centralized, the committee (and almost everyone else) argued.  
This would mean new laws, and Congress would pass them, giving it influence. But its 
influence would not be scattered over eighty-eight committees and subcommittees. 
The key to the Gilmore Commission plan was that it recommended a reorganization of 
Congress itself to centralize control over homeland security matters by having a 
powerful oversight committee in each congressional house. These could override the 
authority of the eighty-eight parochial and fragmented committees. This would mean 
that the committees controlling, say, the Coast Guard or border control, could see their 
authority reduced. This recommendation never succeeded.  Individual committee and 
subcommittee chairs – which are where the power lies – were not likely to support this 
reduction in their power.   
 We have to be careful here. I will make much of congressional resistance to giving 
up committee and subcommittee power. But these committees are closest to the 
public, and are expected to be responsive to their constituencies. They are responsible 
for the fact that our federal system is very decentralized (or fragmented, depending 
upon whose ox is being gored). The committees overseeing, say, border controls and 
immigration, or the Coast Guard, would be able to cry out that the agencies they 
oversee are under funded, or the congressional committee could publicize the failures 
of the FBI or the CIA to coordinate with the agency the committee oversaw (the agency 
itself could not), investigate charges of torture as members of a military affairs 
committee, or charges of waste in Pentagon contracts, and so on. The agency being 
examined is not likely to bring such matters to the attention of the committee or the 
White House. There is a congressional watch-dog function, as well as funding pork-
barrel projects. If a supercommittee was established, it is not clear that the charges of 
failures to coordinate, or torture charges, or underfunding charges, would surface; any 
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actions a regular committee might want to take could easily be overridden by the 
supercommittee. There are reasons for congressional committees and subcommittees 
to want to keep jurisdiction and to exercise power, and it is hard to distinguish “turf” 
from representation of the interests of constituents.   
 (The committee or supercommittee members might fail in quite other ways. They 
easily put narrow local interests over those of the nation, or are so indebted to large 
campaign donors as to fail to represent all segments of their constituency.  But this is 
quite another matter. These narrow interests would be present in the two large 
oversight committees the Gilmore Commission recommended, or, if there were no 
supercommittee, in the eighty-eight committees. They reflect a problem with our form 
of government that goes beyond those of restructuring agencies.)  
 
The Third Option: Congressional Control  
It was a third option that prevailed; congressional control of a new department with 
budgetary, personnel, and mission control by Congress. It was based upon the Hart-
Rudman Commission findings of 2001. It preserved much of congressional committee 
power. (Gary Hart had been a Colorado Senator, a democrat, and Warren Rudman had 
been a republican Senator from New Hampshire, so the interests of Congress were 
likely to be well considered.)  A new cabinet-level department would be created. The 
power of the president would consist of recommending to the Senate a nominee to be 
the secretary of the department, and exercising the normal amount of control the 
president has over any cabinet head. While considerable, of course, presidential power 
would be less than in the first or the second option. Congress is the clear winner.  
Political scientist Donald F. Kettl put it as follows, referring to Tom Ridge: 
What the members of Congress left unsaid was that if Ridge remained a 
presidential appointee without congressional confirmation, they would have little 
control over his operations.  If they could pass legislation authorizing the office, 
setting out its powers, gaining the right to confirm him in office, and controlling 
the office’s budget, they could dramatically shift the balance of power.  Many 
members of Congress saw this as one of the biggest new initiatives in decades, 
and they wanted to ensure that they could control its direction.  Bush turned them 
down, saying through a spokesman that the president did not need congressional 
action to do what was required.18  
Many agencies would be moved from their previous department locations to the new 
department, but the agencies would still be under the supervision of Congress. Thus, 
the secretary of DHS would not have the power to use presidential authority to 
establish new units (e.g. a counter-terrorism threat center that would not be under the 
control of Congress) or force coordination through threatened budget cuts of, say, the 
immigration services, that the first option provided. All the congressional committees 
and sub-committees would still have considerable say over agency budgets and line 
authority; no supercommittees would override them.   
 Nevertheless, even under this option, a high degree of conflict within Congress was 
projected as the new department was considered. One senator was quoted as saying 
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“Hell hath no fury like a committee chairman whose jurisdiction has been taken away” 
and the reshuffling would alter some jurisdictions.19 Congress would lose some 
budgetary authority, and power to make some line appointments, but not as much as 
under the other two options. A bill to establish DHS was introduced by two senators, 
with Connecticut’s Joseph Lieberman (D) taking the lead, and the president reluctantly 
concurred.   
   If the president opposed the Lieberman bill, why did he give in after a few months 
and propose his own bill, very similar except that it included even more agencies than 
the Lieberman bill had? Clarke argues that the White House was about to have two 
disasters: one, an unmanageable department that both houses of Congress strongly 
supported, and two, “the major new piece of legislation in response to September 11 
would be named after the man whom the majority of voters had wanted to be vice 
president just twenty months earlier.” It was better to have one of those two outcomes 
rather than both, so the president sent up a bill that would be called the Homeland 
Security Act, not the Lieberman Act.20    
 A colleague of mine at the Stanford Law School, Laura Donohue, points out that in 
many ways Congress did not achieved new control, but only maintained control over 
existing agency functions, and does not control many new initiatives. The executive 
office has substantial resources. The consequential actions related to homeland 
security were undertaken by executive agencies rather than ones controlled by 
Congress. The Department of Justice expanded the USA PATRIOT Act without 
effective oversight by Congress; the intelligence agencies were unchanged; and the 
executive branch expanded the National Security Letters, Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act warrants, and various collection powers, all of which have been used 
extensively. Congress dismantled the controversial Total Information Awareness 
program that turned truck drivers, postmen, television cable installers, and others into 
counter-intelligence agents, but the White House continued the program with its 
Highway Watch, Marine Watch, Neighborhood Watch, and other programs. Though 
de-funded by Congress, the Defense Department’s Defense Advanced Research 
Projects’ program, with its eighteen data mining operations, was transferred to the 
National Security Agency, the CIA, and FBI.   
 Thus the question of who won and who lost, the executive branch or Congress, is 
not as clear-cut as one might think. But Congress, as we shall see, kept substantial 
access to the barrels of pork that homeland security disgorged, and the White House 
and Republicans in Congress used the pork to further a privatization of the 
government’s agenda. 
  
A ROUGH START AND POOR REVIEWS 
Given the ignominious birth of the department we should not expect it to achieve 
much homeland security for at least a few years, and the initial record sadly confirms 
that expectation. Even if it had strong presidential backing, the difficulty of merging 
diverse tasks, funding the new responsibilities, coping with congressional interests, 
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and the inevitable uses to which organizations can be put, severely limits the 
effectiveness of the department. 
 For starters, the launching was rough and premature. President Bush had resisted 
congressional efforts to establish it, but once Congress passed the law, he set an 
unreasonably ambitious four-month deadline for DHS to open its doors to twenty-two 
agencies that had to move. It had a hard time finding any doors to open and ended up 
stuck in the basement of a Navy building without room to house personnel who were to 
be transferred. Little help in staffing was provided; the Secretary’s staff was very 
sparse. For weeks some offices lacked phones. The budget was so small that finding 
funds was a constant preoccupation. Touted as receiving forty billion dollars, DHS 
received far less in new money. One-third of the money went to other agencies such as 
the Pentagon, and most of the other twenty-seven billion is not new money. Five of the 
twenty-two agencies had a total budget of nineteen billion dollars, which they brought 
with them, and this is counted in the forty billion dollar figure. (See Matthew 
Brzezinski’s scathing and disheartening details on the failings of the department.)21 
Congress’s dozens of committees still have oversight claims on the department, 
through their old ties to the agencies.   
 Congress has watched DHS very carefully. Secretary Ridge said that in the first year 
he and his top assistants testified 160 times, about every day and a half, before 
congressional committees; counting staff in general there were more than 1,300 
briefings on the hill. It takes from twenty-four to forty-eight hours to prepare for a 
briefing, he said. And this did not count the “hundreds and hundreds” of Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) inquiries.22 The executive coordination option may have 
had fewer resources than a department, but they could have been better focused.  
 The department has been watched carefully by several public interest groups such 
as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Brookings 
Institution; by quasi-government groups such as the RAND Corporation and the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies; and, most prominently, by the GAO, 
which is asked to do studies for Congress. There are some differences among the 
reports. For example the Heritage Foundation emphasizes surveillance of citizens, and 
recommends that local law enforcement personnel “submit annual assessments of the 
events, activities, or changes in demographics or patterns of behavior of groups in their 
jurisdiction,” notes a RAND Corporation summary of recommendations by 
commissions and public interest groups.23 (This would reinstall Admiral John 
Poindexters’ Total Information Awareness program in DHS.) The Brookings 
Institution, in contrast, has an economics tilt, and is the only one to weigh the 
budgetary implications of its own recommendations. It is easy to recommend actions 
as if they are costless.   
 The recommendations of the public interest agencies, like those of the dozens of 
commissions (Bremer, Hart-Rudman, Gilmore etc.) are heavily and overly generalized, 
urge more spending than is feasible, and urge actions without any guidance on setting 
priorities, as the RAND Corporation summary notes with sadness.24 Some pay passing 
attention to first responders, but far too little, and I do not recall a single one that 
seriously considered the role of the average citizen.   
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 The collaboration issue is a key one; the failure of agencies to connect has been the 
most prominent of the many 9/11 failures. The GAO and the public interest group 
reports drone on about the need to cooperate, network, collaborate, or link the 
disparate agencies both within DHS, and to link DHS agencies with the powerful 
intelligence and defense agencies outside of it. But cooperation and collaboration are 
not costless, and appear to be the exception in government, not the norm.  It requires 
an exceptional degree of managerial skill at the agency level, and strong signals from 
the top of government. Every agency wants the others to cooperate with it, but is 
reluctant to cooperate with them.  The fear is that autonomy is lost unless cooperation 
is on one’s own terms. It is sad to see these fulsome reports wave the cooperation wand 
without addressing these realities. 
 The GAO itself issued 100 reports on homeland security even before 9/11, and in 
the first three years after that issued over 200 more critical reports. Almost monthly it 
cited a string of failures (and a sprinkling of successes) of the department, and while 
acknowledging that it is insufficiently funded, criticizes its poor fiscal management and 
waste, as did the department’s own Inspector General office. Within a year of its 
creation (the legislation was signed November 25, 2002) the GAO designated DHS as 
“high risk,” indicating serious performance problems.   
 It was not only large (180,000 employees) and diverse (twenty-two agencies with 
650 separate computer systems to integrate), but many of the agencies it took in were 
already “high risk” agencies by GAO standards (that is, not meeting the challenges in 
both security and non-security functions). The moves were not likely to increase their 
performance, since some non-security functions (fishing rights, computer crime, 
tariffs, etc.) might have benefited from staying close to other agencies that were not 
brought in to the new department.  
 The new department merged agencies that, along with their security roles, had 
responsibilities for such activities unrelated to terrorism as fisheries, river floods, 
animal diseases, energy reliability, computer crime, citizenship training, tariffs on 
imports, drug smuggling, and the reliability of telephone networks. The potpourri of 
unrelated activities was to exceed that of any previous large government mergers. 
 Inter-organizational cooperation or coordination is familiar in the business world 
and among voluntary organizations. There is nothing impossible about it. Large 
corporations cooperate routinely on political and legislative matters (conspiracy 
theorists call it the “power elite”). Voluntary organizations, even when competing for 
funds or clients, cooperate informally and through formal super-organizations that 
they fund and join. Networks of small firms in Northern Europe, Japan, and to some 
extent in the U.S. (Silicon Valley companies, biotech firms) cooperate extensively and 
productively, even while competing. And there are radically decentralized firms such 
as Johnson and Johnson that take steps to insure cooperation and coordination among 
their hundreds of small, independent units. It is far from impossible. But in the case of 
agencies thrown together in the government, with only parts of each agency tasked 
with, or assigned, roles in a common enterprise such as protecting the nation from 
terrorists, with diverse histories, and subject to the oversight of several committees, 
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cooperation will be extremely difficult, perhaps more difficult than before the 
reorganization.    
 Public sector transformations are more difficult than those in the private sector, the 
head of the GAO, the Comptroller General, said in a letter to a congressional 
committee, because organizations in the public sector must contend with more power 
centers and stakeholders, have less management flexibility, and are under greater 
scrutiny. Furthermore the top officials are typically political appointees who do not 
stay for long.25 Even in the private sector, where things are easier, his letter notes that 
over forty percent of executives in acquired companies leave within the first year, and 
seventy-five percent within the first three years. It takes from five to seven years, 
according to research, to make mergers and acquisitions work in the private sector, 
even with all that sector’s advantages.  
 In December 2004, Clark Kent Ervin, the inspector general of DHS (a watchdog 
division within the department) was not reappointed. He was a Harvard University-
trained lawyer who had worked in the first Bush administration, and came from Texas. 
But he had issued many critical reports accusing DHS officials of ineptitude and fraud, 
including a charge that almost fifty million dollars in excess profits were paid to 
Boeing.26 He repeated some of his criticisms in an op-ed piece in The New York Times 
after he was fired.27 It was an alarming development, and, as we shall soon see, the 
first of many instances of using the terrorism crisis for corrupt ends.   
 It is still not clear as yet what the reorganization means to the agencies that were 
moved, except that they are expected to take on new duties or increase their security 
efforts. In many cases it may only mean a change in the letterhead, while personnel 
continue to use their contacts with other agencies and go about their business. One 
cannot imagine any great changes in, say, the Plumb Island Animal Disease Center, 
other than increasing their research on the deadly substances that terrorists might use. 
The Federal Protection Services, moved from the General Services Administration, 
may have received some new weapons and was told to have some meetings with the 
Office for Domestic Preparedness (moved from the Justice Department), but one can’t 
imagine much new synergy from such contacts or much new energy. (An exception, 
pointed out me by Laura Donohue, is the Exercise Division, transferred from the 
Department of Justice, running 300 high-quality exercises a year.) But to the extent 
that new security responsibilities are added to the agencies, as must be the case with 
almost all of them, one can imagine that all the agencies folded into the department 
will be having a harder time doing the jobs they were originally designed to do.   
 The improvements made in border security, airline security, immigration checks, 
and a small beginning in port security, all could have been made without any 
reorganization.   
 
New Roles for Old Agencies 
The Immigration Service is designed to let people into the country, particularly those 
whose skills are deemed to be in short supply. It is now asked to deny entry to 
suspected terrorists, and has little expertise to do this. The Border Control agencies are 
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designed to prevent smuggling and illegal entry, but have had little capability to 
identify terrorists among either the legal or illegal entries. Thus new tasks must be 
learned, and connections made, to parts of organizations they had little contact with 
(the FBI’s counter-terrorist divisions and the CIA). And so on through many of the 
twenty-two agencies herded into the new department.   
 One basic problem is making fruitful connections between the relevant agencies. 
Finding the right organization is not easy. If you suspect a threat to your chemical 
plant do you go to the local police, the FBI, EPA, or the Coast Guard or Border Control 
if it’s near a border or the water? Whichever one you pick then has the problem of 
which of the others, and how many, should be involved. (Information should be 
shared, and dots connected.) If there is a dispute among them as to what actions to 
take, or what resources a unit should supply, what is the next level that would resolve 
the dispute? The organizations contacted may not accept your authority if you demand 
specific resources, or you may not be sure who has the resources you think necessary.    
 Even the question of what person you contact in the organization may be 
problematical. Take, for example, the frustrations of the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC). Though (fortunately) not transferred to DHS, it illustrates the inter-
organizational problems of combating terrorism.   
 Shortly after 9/11 an anthrax attack occurred, sending the lethal substance through 
the mail, where sorting machines spread it randomly to hundreds of addresses in 
addition to the intended addresses. The Centers for Disease Control was the natural 
place to handle such an emergency, but they were caught off guard. What they knew 
about anthrax came from agricultural settings, where it occurs naturally and infects 
animals and farm workers. “Everything we knew about the disease just did not fit with 
what was going on. We were totally baffled,” said an official of the public health 
system.28 Anthrax had always been an agricultural problem, but now it was a criminal 
one, thus requiring contact with the FBI. But, an official at CDC told me, there was no 
reason for the Centers to have any established links with the FBI. The FBI dealt with 
criminals, the CDC with microbes and victims. But one might think that networking 
should be easy; just get on the phone and call the FBI. (“Listen to the options carefully; 
they have changed.”) But who would they call? Since the FBI had no experience with 
what looked like a criminal epidemic, their help lines were of little use. (“Your call is 
important to us; please try again.”) 
 This official had, by chance, struck up a friendship with an FBI agent as a result of a 
totally unrelated conference a year before. She had his number, she explained the 
problem, and he was able to run interference for her up the FBI hierarchy to the 
appropriate level and office. (It is not clear how the Centers for Disease Control 
escaped being folded into DHS; given the threat of bioterrorism it would seem to 
belong there more than, say, the Plumb Island Animal Disease Center. But given its 
unique character and extraordinary importance and expertise, one can be grateful that 
it remains reasonably independent.)   
 Since the attack was unpredicted, there were no established routines to call into 
play. Not only had the Centers never dealt with the FBI, they had had no reason to deal 
with the U.S. Postal Service, state and local police agencies, and so on. Not only were 
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there layers of phone numbers that needed to be searched, but the officials dealing 
with the attack had no authority over other agencies, such as local post offices or 
police, to get them to do what they thought needed doing once they found them. 
Agencies all have their organizational interests, jurisdictions, and clout.  Networks are 
not hierarchical; the units have autonomy. An official of the CDC said they were not 
prepared “for layers and levels of collaboration among a vast array of government 
agencies and professional organizations that would be required to be efficient and 
successful in the anthrax outbreak.”29    
 Even when you successfully network, what authority do you have? A Connecticut 
State health officer, where there was a mysterious anthrax illness, said “we were very 
much aware that we had no jurisdiction over federal facilities whether it was the V.A. 
or the post office.”30 Reorganization of the government will not solve problems such as 
these, nor will injunctions to establish “clear lines of authority.”  As the ample disaster 
and emergency response literature shows, it will require frequent drills, exercises, 
simulations, and meetings where diverse agencies get a chance to see each other’s 
point of view, establish personal contact, and build trust.  This is new work, and in turn 
requires increased budgets. The efficient agency is one that is using every dollar it gets 
to increase its efficiency; add terrorism to its charge, and its budget must increase, or it 
will no longer be an efficient agency. Yet, as we have seen, the first responder agencies 
are grossly under funded.   
 
 
Organizational Problems: Displacement of Missions 
A small chunk of the new Department of Homeland Security contains the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. What would happen to its traditional concern, 
natural disasters? The fate of programs concerned with natural disasters under DHS 
was a concern from the beginning. FEMA Director Joe Albaugh was asked early in 
2002 about this and told Congress that the traditional role of FEMA would not be 
affected. But even Republican lawmakers were not convinced.   Rep. Don Young (D-
AK), Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said that if 
the Homeland Security Secretary wanted to redirect the agency and focus on 
preventing terrorist attacks, he could reduce “other [FEMA] missions and direct those 
resources entirely to security.” Congressman Young had good reason to think this 
possible. This is what President Reagan’s first appointment did, downgrading natural 
and industrial disasters and upgrading the threat of a nuclear attack and the rounding 
up of domestic radicals.31  
 To forestall this, the chair of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Richard 
Armey (R-TX) redrafted the White House proposal to keep FEMA primarily an agency 
dealing with natural disasters. Since the White House objected, this suggested that a 
displacement of its mandate would indeed be in the cards. Some senators and the 
highly regarded former FEMA head, James Witt, along with the Brookings Institution, 
were all opposed to putting FEMA in the new Department.32 Brookings foresaw the 
problems that were to come in a report that concluded “while a merged FEMA might 
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become highly adept at preparing for and responding to terrorism, it would likely 
become less effective in performing its current mission in case of natural disasters as 
time, effort, and attention are inevitably diverted to other tasks within the larger 
organization.”33 Instead, the authors of this report urged that FEMA retain its status as 
an independent agency and that federal preparedness and response functions be 
consolidated within that agency, rather than within DHS. 
 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 disclosed an unprepared and fractured 
response. Many attributed a good bit of the problem to a FEMA that had been captured 
by terrorist concerns and staffed by inexperienced political appointees. I have 
discussed the many justifications and some limitations of this interpretation.34 It 
seems plausible that FEMA’s absorption by the Department of Homeland Security, the 
resulting emphasis on terrorism rather than natural disasters, and the inattention to 
natural disasters by the Bush Administration, account for much of the Katrina and Rita 
failures.   
 
Organizational Challenges: New Tasks, Few New Resources 
A further problem was what happened to the agencies when they were transferred to 
DHS and given added homeland security tasks, but expected to continue with their 
usual ones, often with no significant budget increase, if any. In Pittsburgh, where the 
Coast Guard helps control traffic on the busy Ohio River, homeland security activities 
had accounted for ten percent of Coast Guard activity; it now grew to fifty percent. This 
meant cutting other activities, such as assisting boaters and acting as traffic cops on 
the crowded river. The Coast Guard’s effort in drug interdiction declined by sixty 
percent after 9/11, and time invested in preventing an encroachment on American 
fishing territories and enforcing fishing rules shrank thirty-eight percent.35 One might 
say that at least priorities were changed by the Coast Guard, but increased funding for 
security could have left the old activities in place if they were deemed necessary.  
 The U.S. Border Patrol is an example of inadequate funding for new tasks. It hasn’t 
had much to do on the 4,000 mile border with Canada. But a terrorist was caught 
(almost accidentally) bringing explosives over the border to be used in an attack on the 
Los Angeles airport. Then it was learned that some 9/11 terrorists used Canada as a 
port of entry. The Border Patrol, in 2002, had only 330 agents supported by one 
analyst to intercept illegal crossings of the 4,000 mile border. In the last twenty years, 
200 agents have been cut in government downsizing efforts. Half the inspection 
booths were simply closed.36 As of April, 2004, miles and miles of the border consist of 
dense, overgrown brush where before there had been cleared spaces. In 2004 the 
Border Patrol finally received more resources for an impossible task.   
  A serious problem has emerged that concerns the critical area of first responders – 
police, fire, emergency medical, and various voluntary associations and homeowners 
associations. The title of a 2003 Council of Foreign Relations task force report summed 
up the problem: “Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously 
Unprepared.”37 The under-funding by government at all levels was declared to be 
extensive. The report estimated that combined federal, state, and local expenditures 
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would have to be tripled over the next five years to address this unmet need. Covering 
this funding shortfall using federal funds alone would require a fivefold increase from 
the current level of $5.4 billion per year to an annual federal expenditure of $25.1 
billion. Nor would these funds provide gold-plated responses; they would go to 
essentials. For example, the Council’s executive summary gave these examples of 
deficiencies:  
• On average, fire departments across the country have only enough radios to 
equip half the firefighters on a shift, and breathing apparatuses for only one-
third. Only ten percent of fire departments in the United States have the 
personnel and equipment to respond to a building collapse.  
• Police departments in cities across the country do not have the protective 
gear to safely secure a site following an attack with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  
• Public health laboratories in most states still lack basic equipment and 
expertise to adequately respond to a chemical or biological attack, and seventy-
five percent of state labs report being overwhelmed by too many testing 
requests.  
• Most cities do not have the necessary equipment to determine what kind of 
hazardous materials emergency responders may be facing. A study found that 
only eleven percent of fire departments were prepared to deal with the collapse 
of buildings with over fifty inhabitants, thirteen percent with chemical or 
biological attacks, and only twenty-five percent with equipment to 
communicate with state or federal emergency-response agencies.38  
Furthermore, the funds that the federal government did allocate for emergency 
responders were sidetracked and stalled due to a politicized appropriations process, 
the slow distribution of funds by federal agencies, and bureaucratic red tape at all 
levels of government, according to GAO reports. 
 Congress itself has played a substantial role in hampering the effort. The $3.5 
billion promised by the White House in January 2002 for first responders in the state 
and local governments fell victim to partisan squabbles in Congress, not being 
approved until over a year later, in February 2003.   
 
ORGANIZATIONAL USES 
Organizations, as I have argued, are tools that can be used by those within and without 
them for purposes that have little to do with their announced goals.39 A new 
organization such as DHS invites use. As soon as the department was established, the 
corporate lobbying began. Four of Secretary Tom Ridge’s senior deputies, in his initial 
position as assistant for homeland security at the White House, left for the private 
sector and began work as homeland security lobbyists, as did his legislative affairs 
director in the White House. The number of lobbyists who registered and listed 
“homeland,” “security,” or “terror” on their forms was already sizeable at the beginning 
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of 2002, numbering 157, but jumped to 569 as of April 2003. One lawyer for a 
prominent Washington, D.C. law firm was up-front about corporate interests. He 
mentions in his on-line resume that he authored a newsletter article titled 
“Opportunity and Risk: Securing Your Piece of the Homeland Security Pie.”40 It is a 
very large pie indeed.   
 A web page document, “Market Opportunities in Homeland Security,” introduces 
one to the “$100 billion” homeland security marketplace, for $500.00 plus shipping. 
Less exuberant in its predictions, a Frost & Sullivan report indicates the industry 
generated $7.49 billion just in 2002, with total market revenues of sixteen billion 
dollars estimated for 2009. Frost and Sullivan is an “international growth 
consultancy,” found at www.frost.com. A report from Govexec.com by Shane Harris, 
“The homeland security market boom,” published less than six months after 9/11, 
documents the aggressiveness of U.S. business in flocking to the new funding source. 
“Every good company out there can take what they do and reposition it for homeland 
defense,” says Roger Baker, the former chief information officer of the Commerce 
Department, and now with a private company.41   
 There were intra-government uses too. Presidential declarations of disaster areas, 
and the federal funds that followed, varied directly with the political importance of the 
area to the president of the time. Shortly after 9/11 the USA PATRIOT Act was passed.  
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont was the chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, and he wrote in the criteria for distributing some $13.1 billion 
among the states. His committee used a formula long in use for distributing much 
smaller funds, one that favored the small states. The small states now resisted any 
change in the formula, and could do so since they had the power in the Senate.  The 
funding was almost exactly in reverse order of the threat. (The degree of threat being 
used had been assessed by a non-governmental research organization using 
sophisticated probability models.) The ten highest amounts went to states and districts 
with the least threat, except for Washington, D.C., where the congresspeople live.  Thus 
Wyoming received sixty-one dollars per person, California only fourteen dollars.  
Alaska, hardly a target for terrorism, received fifty-eight dollars, while New York, the 
target of six separate plots by Islamic terrorists in the last decade, got only twenty-five 
dollars per person.   
 This point deserves elaboration. The formula meant that forty percent of the funds 
had to be divided equally among the states, regardless of population. The Executive 
Branch had discretion over the remaining sixty percent, but distributed it according to 
each state’s population, rather than the risk exposure of the state’s population. In early 
2003 Congress announced a plan that might rectify the situation, a new $100 million 
grant for “high threat” urban areas only. New York City, for example, would get 
twenty-five percent of it. Immediately, Congress pressed the administration to increase 
the size of the lucrative hand-out, and also increased the number of cities at risk. 
Disasters are funding opportunities. Soon fifty cities, perhaps politically important to 
the Administration, were designated as “high threat,” and while the size of the grant 
grew to $675 million, New York City received only seven percent instead of twenty-five 
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percent. Democrats charged that the Bush Administration doesn’t have a constituency 
in the big cities, and so it allowed this to happen.42     
 Despite charges that federal outlays were being distorted by the basic formula in 
use, and only partially rectified by the grants to specific cities, the formula was still in 
place at the end of 2004. The House approved a bill to have the funding formula reflect 
the risks the states faced, and the White House, to its credit, made a similar request in 
its 2005 budget. But the Senate would have none of it.  Senator Leahy is a member of 
the powerful Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, and his state of 
Vermont gets a handsome fifty-four dollars per capita. He curtly reminded Secretary 
Ridge of the power of small states such as his. “I have to say, I was really disappointed 
that the president’s proposed budget … drops the all-state minimum formula,” he said. 
“That would affect all but, I think, one or two in this subcommittee.” He charged that 
the Administration “wants to shortchange rural states.” The bill, according to senate 
aides, “would go nowhere,” and it didn’t.43   
 Wyoming is the number-one recipient of homeland security money per capita. 
Asked about this, a Wyoming official remarked, typically, that “our citizens deserve the 
same kind of protection afforded to those in other places in the country.” This was 
from the chief of police in Douglas (population 5,238), who had just received a new 
$50,000 silver RV that serves as an emergency operation command center, paid for 
with federal dollars. A tiny county in North Dakota purchased more biochemical suits 
than the county had police officers, and in 2004 Juneau, Alaska spent almost a million 
dollars for a robot to deactivate bombs, decontamination equipment, and night vision 
goggles. (See the useful analysis of how political scientists account for such things in 
Patrick Robert’s “Shifting Priorities.”44) Firefighters in Casper, Wyoming even denied 
they were less at risk than, say, New York City residents. “No one can say Casper can’t 
be a terrorist target” one of them remarked. Wyoming had the largest surplus, as a 
percentage of the state budget, of any state in the nation. Yet the seriously in-debt state 
of California spends five times as much, per person, of its own money on homeland 
security – taxes its citizens pay – as does Wyoming.45 The unrepresentative character 
of the Senate and the parochial interests of the citizens of small states, who expect 
their senators to bring in the federal dollars, make it difficult to respond to our 
vulnerabilities.46 
 Finally, in December 2004, DHS was able to get around Senator Leahy’s bill and 
announced a new formula that focused upon cities, rather than states (over the 
protests of small states) and went part way to matching funds to threats. New York 
City was the biggest winner, going from a forty-seven-million-dollar grant to $208 
million; Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago and Boston got smaller increases.47   
California Senator Diane Feinstein tried again to further increase the proportion of 
funds to risky areas in 2005, but Senators Collins (VT) and Lieberman (CT) blocked it.  
We should not be surprised.  Patrick Roberts notes: “The last time Congress bypassed 
the usual guarantees for small states in a major grant program was in 1956 when it 
spent $31.5 billion over thirteen years to build interstate highways.”48  
 The GAO, individual congresspeople, and investigative reporters, have detailed 
extensive examples of “pork” spending by DHS. Even when the department’s own 
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personnel reject grants, they are overridden by their superiors.  One example concerns 
security at our ports. While the major ports did get the largest grants, smaller ones 
went to ports in places like St. Croix in the Virgin Islands (hardly a target), Martha’s 
Vineyard in Massachusetts, one in Ludington, Michigan, and fully six locations in 
Arkansas.49 The contracting abuse was enormous. The Washington Post said “the 
government's internal audits have repeatedly questioned the cost and effectiveness of 
the equipment and security systems bought from corporations that received a torrent 
of money under loosened regulations, limited oversight and tight congressional 
deadlines.” The Office of Management and Budget found that only four of the thirty-
three homeland security programs it examined were "effective."50     
 A more serious charge than providing a barrel of pork for states and corporations is 
made by Eric Klinenberg and Thomas Frank in a Rolling Stones article. They argue 
that Katrina was the occasion for furthering a privatization policy within DHS and 
FEMA that amounts to an expansion of “market-based government.”  Rather than 
label it “pork” they call it “looting,” and then document it. Some 300 corporate 
lobbyists and lawyers gathered in a Senate office building, barely a month after the 
hurricane struck, to hear Senate Majority leader Bill Frist (R-TN) announce that some 
$100 billion would be spent on Katrina recovery (and many attendees thought that was 
less than half of what would be spent, as do Klinenberg and Frank). No-bid contracts 
followed, going to large, politically connected corporations, with so little oversight that 
the GAO was appalled, and the press headlined stories of gargantuan waste.51  
Disasters are opportunities. It is speculated that the Katrina/Rita disaster is the large 
wedge for privatization and reducing social welfare spending. 
   
 
Another Organizational Use: De-unionizing 
The new department offered opportunities to further other presidential agendas 
unrelated to the terrorist threat. Though President Bush did not favor the department 
and its massive movement of twenty-two agencies, it provided an opportunity for what 
appeared to be an attack upon civil service. President Bush immediately demanded 
that Congress strip of civil service status all employees who would be transferred. 
Liberals and labor saw this as an attack upon the eighteen different government unions 
that would reduce the amount of union membership in the government significantly. 
The president argued that because of the unique, non-routine nature of defense of the 
homeland, the Department needed to be free of civil service and union restrictions on 
terminating employees. (It is hard to imagine that the union members among the 
180,000 employees were engaged in such non-routine and vital tasks that civil service 
regulations would hamper them.) The matter dragged on until March 2003 and the 
last day for final comment on the proposal. A ninety-one page comment from three 
powerful unions representing about one quarter of the department’s workers arrived. 
The unions had squared off for a fight.    
 DHS and the Office of Personnel Management proposed regulations that would 
cover 110,000 of the department’s 180,000 employees, affecting how they would be 
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paid, promoted, and disciplined. It would become a model for revamping civil service 
rules in the rest of the federal government. Pay would be linked to performance 
(political performance and less aggressive bargaining, the union argued), union 
bargaining rights in several areas would be restricted (e.g. deployment of workers and 
the use of technology) and the government would speed up and tighten the disciplinary 
process.52 There was a lengthy standoff, and as of October 2005, the issue is still in 
dispute since a federal judge, for the second time, ruled the new personnel rules 
invalid.53 Again, disasters are opportunities.   
 
Departure of Key Personnel  
The departure of seasoned terrorist experts started almost immediately. Rand Beers 
had thirty-five year’s experience in intelligence; he had replaced Oliver North, who was 
the director for counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics in the Reagan administration. 
Beers spent seven months in the new department, and five days after the Iraq invasion 
in March 2003 he resigned. Three months later he told a Washington Post reporter of 
his disaffection with the counter-terrorism effort, which was making us less secure. 
The focus on Iraq, he said, “has robbed domestic security of manpower, brainpower 
and money.”54 Agreeing with many, Beers saw the minimalist Afghanistan war as only 
dispersing al Qaeda and not pursued enough to disable it, and the maximal Iraq war as 
recruiting terrorists. Another disaffected expert, Richard Clarke, left in February of 
2003, just before the Iraq invasion, saying the same thing. His revelations about the 
misdirected, under-funded, and bureaucratically incompetent response to the terrorist 
threat, Against All Enemies, made the best seller lists in April 2004. 
 Others departed or would not be recruited. A New York Times story in September 
2003, six months after the start of the department, reported two top officials leaving.  
“So few people want to work at the department that more than fifteen people declined 
requests to apply for the top post in its intelligence unit – and many others turned 
down offers to run several other key offices, government officials said.”55 The 
administration announced that 795 people in the FBI’s cybersecurity office would be 
transferred to DHS, but most decided to stay with the more reliably funded, higher-
status FBI and only twenty-two joined the new department.56 Flynt Leverett, who 
served on the White House National Security Council for about a year until March 
2003 and is now a fellow at the Brookings Institution, observed, "If you take the 
(White House) counterterrorism and Middle East offices, you've got about a dozen 
people ... who came to this administration wanting to work on these important issues 
and left after a year or often less because they just don't think that this administration 
is dealing seriously with the issues that matter.”57 (For other examples see Clarke’s 
Against all Enemies.) 
 
Centralizing to Combat a Decentralized Enemy 
There is no evidence that the reorganization anticipates a strategy recommended by 
some commentators: structuring the agencies so that their structure matches the 
threat. Unfortunately, those who make this recommendation have not offered 
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compelling theoretical arguments to support their position. But it does make 
considerable sense nevertheless, and is worth exploring. There is a mismatch between 
the nature of the threat (involving highly-decentralized terrorist networks) and the 
response (an attempt to create a centralized, hierarchical agency). Given the nature of 
current Islamic terrorism of the al Qaeda type – unpredictable acts by elements of a 
loosely coordinated network – many experts say what is required is a highly 
decentralized response that would allow considerable autonomy for the groups 
involved – first responders, intelligence agencies, border control agencies, airlines, 
ground transportation agencies, etc. Because the actions of the terrorists are 
unpredictable, a great deal of latitude must be given to those on the ground. (For a 
devastating critique of The 9/11 Commission Report in connection with its handling of 
the first responder problem – calling for centralizing what should be decentralized – 
see Kathleen Tierney, “The 9/11 Commission and Disaster Management.”58)    
 The central authority should be restricted to such matters as threat assessment and 
warnings that come from outside DHS, and frequent surveys, reviews and evaluations 
of DHS units. This is quite compatible with decentralized response strategies, and 
certainly with decentralized tactics. Unfortunately, the immediate response of most 
politicians, and often many administrators, to signs of poor coordination, indifference 
to changing environments, and new tasks, is to rein everyone in, to centralize, and give 
specific tactical orders. I am sure this is what Senator Lieberman and others had in 
mind when they wrote their proposed bill, a version of which the president finally 
accepted. It was easy to react this way to incredible stories of bungling and 
mismanagement by, in particular, the credibility-challenged CIA and the balkanized 
fiefdoms of the FBI.  
 But interestingly enough, these favorite whipping boys of the 9/11 tragedy/fiasco 
escaped the steamroller that ran over so many agencies. They were to remain outside 
DHS (though they were threatened to be reined in), in another misdiagnosis of the 
problem and another attempt at centralization sure mostly to fail to make us safer.  We 
turn to that for our final topic.   
   
DHS AND INTELLIGENCE 
Most commentators see the biggest failing of the largest reorganization of the 
government in recent times, the creation of DHS, as the failure to connect it with the 
dots of the intelligence agencies (which remain unconnected in themselves). The 
Department of Homeland Security managed to get only one office of the FBI (the 
National Infrastructure Protection Center) and assurances that a few DHS members 
could sit in on the coordinating committees in the intelligence community (IC). DHS 
can ask for information, but has no assurance it will get it. Since intelligence is critical 
for security, for deciding where to put resources, what kind of threat is likely, for alerts 
that one is imminent, for knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of terrorist 
groups, and so on, DHS is almost totally dependent upon the fragmented IC. Of 
course, many things are obvious: cockpit doors of aircraft must be hardened, container 
ports are vulnerable, as are national landmarks and nuclear power plants and chemical 
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plants, and so on. But intelligence is needed to decide how much money and effort 
should go to each type of target, since perhaps only a third of the funds needed to do 
the most obvious things are available. What are terrorists most likely to attack?  And 
intelligence is needed to anticipate the size and strategies of the attackers, and when to 
sound an alert that an attack is imminent.   
 One doubts that the IC has been able to be of much service to DHS in these matters.  
Even when DHS gets warnings from the IC it has had trouble communicating with its 
own agencies. Both federal and state agencies said they were informed of “orange 
alerts” only by listening to CNN, not by DHS. And some governors and mayors refused 
to respond to the orange alerts since they were so vague and response was so 
expensive. DHS appears to find it difficult to be responsive itself. Testing the 
capabilities of its police force, the U.S. Park Police deliberately left a suspicious black 
bag on the grounds of the Washington Monument. The police failed to respond quickly 
or effectively. One officer reportedly was caught sleeping. When a test official called 
the Department of Homeland Security to warn them about the bag, he got this 
priceless recording from our protectors: "Due to the high level of interest in the new 
department, all of our lines are busy. However, your call is important to us and we 
encourage you to call back soon."59  
 Should DHS have gotten more control over those security agencies that are not 
clearly related to military strategy and battlefield tactics? (Probably the bulk of the 
estimated forty billion dollars spent yearly on security is military-related.) Should they 
have at least gotten the FBI, which is primarily concerned with domestic security, 
though it does operate abroad to some extent? Aside from the problem of the sheer size 
of DHS being increased even more, the consensus is that the security agencies are far 
too powerful for even parts of them to be moved. As Amy Zegart argues, agencies 
concerned with foreign affairs, such as the intelligence agencies, are oriented towards 
the president, rather than Congress, and controlled by the president to a greater degree 
than domestic agencies.60 The interests of the president and the intelligence agencies 
thus were “aligned,” as political scientists put it. Even if it were wise to give the non-
military intelligence agencies to DHS, it was not likely to happen. DHS could not even 
get control of the FBI.   
 When the 9/11 Commission released its report in the summer of 2004, we got 
another burst of government reorganization.61 The Commission recommended a 
radical change in the intelligence community. It was to be headed by an intelligence 
director with cabinet-level status and the authority to determine the budgets and key 
personnel of all of the fifteen agencies that made up the IC. The Commission was on 
well-trodden ground with its recommendation. In just the last ten years there have 
been thirteen major studies and reports concerning our national intelligence system. 
They all recommended reorganizations, particularly to centralize controls over the 
disparate activities. Political scientist Thomas H. Hammond asks “why is the 
intelligence community so difficult to redesign?”62 Bureaucratic politics and power, of 
the sort we have been examining, play a role, he acknowledges, but there are further 
structural reasons.  
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 He argues that because of dilemmas inherent in any structural setup, the 
reorganization plans have enough faults in them to prevent any agreement on basic 
changes. For example the intelligence community (IC) both collects information, and 
integrates and disseminates it. A structure good for collection may be poor for 
integration and dissemination, and vice versa. Furthermore, a structure that favors 
rapidly acting upon intelligence in any situation short of an imminent attack, say 
acting on the August 2001 warnings and information about flight schools, etc., has 
costs. It may disrupt the source of information and prevent further surveillance that 
could identify more terrorists and their organizations. (This is the classic tension 
between the FBI and the CIA.) Finally, a structure that is appropriate for dealing with 
one kind of threat, for example, state-sponsored terrorism, will not be appropriate for 
another kind of threat, such as that presented by al Qaeda. A major criticism of the 
Bush administration’s handling of terrorism from 2000-2001 was that it was still 
preoccupied with state-sponsored threats from North Korea, Iran, Syria, and even, to 
some extent, Russia, whereas the IC should have been reorganized to deal with the 
mounting threat of Islamic terrorist organizations.   
 But neither structure might be appropriate for domestic terrorism as represented 
by the Oklahoma City bombing or by leaderless groups, or by individuals loosely 
connected for an action on abortion clinics, power grids, logging operations, etc., and 
then dissolving. All three forms of terrorism are still present dangers, but we can 
hardly have three separate structures to deal with them.  The appearance of non-state-
sponsored groups like al Qaeda has not meant the disappearance of state-sponsored 
terrorism or even anthrax mailings. So how should the structure be oriented? 
 The complex trade-offs required have produced a kind of structural conservatism 
on the part of intelligence policy makers, Hammond argues. No alternative structure 
has seemed clearly superior to the present one. And of course the costs of tearing 
organizations apart and disrupting career paths are substantial.  
 Hammond illustrates the difficulties when he outlines six functions (and policy 
areas) of the Intelligence Community (IC), and they give pause to any easy solution. 
Recognition of the variety (and possible incompatibility) of these functions and policy 
areas does not seem to have been addressed by the December 2004 intelligence reform 
bill signed by the president.  They are:  
• Determining the intentions and monitoring the capabilities of the Soviet 
Union, China, North Korea, Iran, etc.; 
• Monitoring the nuclear proliferation technologies, capabilities, and 
intentions of foreign state and non-state organizations; 
• Counterterrorism at home and abroad; 
• Providing intelligence support for anti-drug campaigns; 
• Providing intelligence support for U.S. government policy in Iraq; 
• Supporting U.S. combat operations.63 
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The intelligence reorganization of December 2004 primarily involves the creation of 
a new director of intelligence who will have budgetary control over all fifteen agencies. 
This prompted strong opposition from the Pentagon, but it was temporarily defeated 
when the public outcry finally brought the reluctant president to force a congressional 
committee chairman allied to the Pentagon to back down. (Another chairman made 
the issue of illegal immigration hostage to the bill, but only partially succeeded.) The 
details of the reorganization and budgetary changes were “still to be determined” at the 
end of 2004, and as of October 2005, it appears that intelligence is not to be 
centralized after all. The new “czar,” John Negroponte has not behaved like one, and 
the Pentagon, CIA, and the FBI will retain much of their autonomy.64 It does not 
appear that the vague legislation will address the dilemmas that Hammond identifies.   
 Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA), one of only two members of the Senate to vote against 
the bill, delivered a scathing speech dealing with the limitations of the bill, which are 
now apparent. Congress in general wished to give more power to the head of the new 
agency, but the Pentagon and other interests got the powers watered down. But Byrd 
was primarily concerned about the hasty passage of a long, complicated bill whose 
latest version the Senate had only twenty-four hours to review; the secrecy the bill 
provided to the new agency, closing off ombudsman reviews and whistle-blower 
protection; the failure to deal with prison scandals associated with intelligence 
interrogation and the successful attempt to limit inquiries into possible prison abuses;  
changing mandates to promises regarding new resources; and the successful attempt 
to reinstate and reinforce powers under the PATRIOT Act that Congress wanted 
reconsidered, parts of which the courts had thrown out. The intelligence bill was 
described by civil liberties groups as a Trojan horse, using the opportunity for reform 
of intelligence failures to greatly weaken civil liberties.65 Excerpts from Senator Byrd’s 
remarks are worth quoting since they touch on many of the organizational issues we 
have been dealing with.  
 
Among the distinguished experts on intelligence and security who argued 
against hasty passage and recommended deliberate consideration in Congress 
next term were David Boren, Bill Bradley, Frank Carlucci, William Cohen, 
Robert Gates, Gary Hart, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Warren Rudman, and 
George Schultz. Intelligence reform needs to consider broader issues than the 
war on terror, but the bill does not. It fails to address the unfolding prison 
abuse scandals in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. The conference 
agreement eliminates provisions to ensure that the Congress receives timely 
access to intelligence, and it also allows the White House's Office of 
Management and Budget to screen testimony before the Intelligence Director 
presents it to the Congress. This insures political control over what Congress 
hears, since the OMB is the most political government agency.    
 Whistle blower protections for intelligence officials who report to the 
Congress also have been stricken from the Senate-passed bill. The conference 
agreement creates senior intelligence positions, but exempts many of them 
from confirmation by the Senate. It eliminates the privacy and civil rights 
safeguards included in the Senate-passed bill, and it strips 18 pages of 
legislative text that would have created an Inspector General and Ombudsman 
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to oversee the Intelligence Director's office. That language has been replaced 
with one paragraph, authorizing the Intelligence Director, at his discretion, to 
create or not to create an Inspector General, and provides the Director with the 
power to decide which, if any investigative powers, to grant the Inspector 
General. 
 That means the new Intelligence Director could exempt his office from 
Inspector General audits and investigations, and that the Congress would not 
receive reports from an objective internal auditor. The Congress is limiting its 
own access to vital information within this new Intelligence Office, and it will 
have, thereby, compromised an essential mechanism for identifying potential 
abuses within the new Intelligence Program. 
 Given the dark history of abuses of civil liberties and privacy rights by our 
intelligence community, I had hoped that the Congress would exercise more 
caution, but it has not done so in this legislation. The 9/11 Commission 
recognized that its recommendations call for the government to increase its 
presence in people's lives, and so it wisely endorsed the creation of an 
independent Civil Liberties Board to defend our privacy rights and liberties. 
The Senate-passed bill embraced this recommendation and included additional 
protections to help ensure that executive agencies could not exert undue 
influence on the Board.  
 This conference agreement scuttles those protections by burying the Board 
deep inside of the Office of the President, subjecting Board members to White 
House pressure. The conferees included language making changes to the 1978 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the law that blurs the rules on 
electronic surveillance and physical searches by the U.S. Government. This 
conference report states that the Intelligence Director shall have authority to 
direct or undertake electronic surveillance and physical search operations 
pursuant to FISA if authorized by statute or executive order. This is dangerous 
ground to walk when the president, through executive order, and, without the 
authorization of the Congress, can direct this new Intelligence Director to 
undertake electronic surveillance and physical search operations.    
 Yet another provision would make terrorist crimes subject to a rebuttable 
presumption of pretrial detention, which means that prosecutors won't be 
required to show a judge that the defendant is a flight risk. Instead, the 
defendant will be presumed to be a flight risk. With regard to homeland 
security, the bill authorizes a significant increase in the number of border patrol 
agents, immigration investigators, and a significant increase in the number of 
beds for immigration detention. The bill also authorizes increased funding for 
air cargo security and for screening airline passengers for explosives. All of 
these are worthy goals, but the provisions are just empty promises. Last 
September, when I offered an amendment to the Homeland Security 
Appropriations bill to fund these precise activities, the White House opposed 
the amendment and my Republican colleagues lined up and voted against it. 
Today, members will line up and vote for more empty promises. This bill is a 
hodge-podge  of empty border security promises that the Administration has no  
intention of funding, and that will only encourage the kind of  illegal 
immigration that leaves our country wide open to terrorists.  
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Passing this bill in the waning hours of the 108th Congress means that, for 
all intents and purposes, intelligence reform will be removed from the agenda 
of the next Congress. By passing this bill today, the Senate will be giving 
political cover to those who wish to dismiss calls for more thorough reform of 
intelligence agencies to fix problems that are not addressed in the legislation, 
including the Iraq WMD fiasco and the abuse of prisoners in secret detention 
facilities. Under this conference report, the total amount of intelligence 
spending will remain classified, so the American people may never know if the 
President is short-changing the reform effort that this bill requires.66  
  
The problem of Congressional oversight remained after the reorganization of 
intelligence. An attempt to establish a single supercommittee in each branch of 
Congress fell prey to the interests of existing committee chairmen. The Chairman of 
the Rules Committee of the House complained that giving jurisdiction over Border 
Control, and the newly established Transportation Security Agency, to a 
supercommittee left him with “scars.” “I will be dining alone,” he said. But another 
representative, a Republican from Pennsylvania, Curt Weldon said “but when you read 
the legislative language, it guts all the authority.” Another Republican representative 
said: “I think we’re fighting tonight for the soul of Congress. It’s turf battles, it’s people 
who want to go back to September 10” in terms of congressional oversight.67     
 I think the most important factor will be the intentions of the president. He has 
appointed a director who presumably shares his political vision, but the Pentagon is 
suspected of starting its own domestic intelligence agency that will be out of reach of 
the new director. Structural changes are needed, and one may rejoice that a terrorist 
threat integration center will be a substantial part of the new agency. But, as noted, the 
new head of the IC is not likely to solve the dilemmas, even with a new terrorist threat 
center. A center established in the Clinton administration was moderately successful; 
the same center in the Bush administration was not. A very great deal depends upon 
executive leadership, much more than structural reorganizations, as important as they 
may be.  
 
DREARY CONCLUSIONS 
There is no doubt in my mind that the nation is somewhat safer since the 9/11 attack. 
Suspects have been apprehended, the FAA has made changes, and so has the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. But the first two were made outside of the 
new Department of Homeland Security, and the third easily could have been made 
without its appearance. The department has had very limited success in making our 
vulnerable chemical and nuclear stockpiles more secure. Our borders are still so 
porous that it would be sheer luck if a guard happened on to a terrorist. Only a few of 
the thousands of containers that daily enter our ports are said to be under some 
surveillance, though DHS has been active there.  But the new surveillance (and more 
breaches of basic privacy, unfortunately) of populations that might harbor terrorists is 
handled by Justice. Billions have been spent to improve intelligence and first 
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responder capabilities, but intelligence funding is outside of DHS.  That does not leave 
us with much to be grateful for from department. 
 And we have no idea how many more billions would need to be spent, and where to 
spend them, in order to close all the holes in our open society. It is foolish to think our 
society will ever be safe from determined terrorists, but it is probable that we have 
raised the bar just enough to make it a bit more difficult for them, and this may be at 
least a small part of the explanation as to why we have not been successfully attacked 
since September 11, 2001 – over four years at the time of this writing.  
 A better explanation for the hiatus on attacks is that the U.S. has been shown to be 
vulnerable, and that may be enough for the terrorists.  There is room for small attacks, 
of course, but more pressing for the Islamic Jihad is getting “infidel” troops out of 
Islamic nations (principally U.S. troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan, but there are 
other countries) and destabilizing Islamic regimes that are corrupt and shaky, driving 
out all infidels and installing fundamentalist regimes. Terrorists have shown no 
aptitude for sophisticated attacks involving biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.68 
The London subway attack was primitive. The Madrid train station attack appears to 
have been motivated at least as much by previous jailing of Moroccan terrorists as by 
any attack upon state support of the Iraq war. Al Qaeda signed on and helped, but it 
did not seem to be part of their fundamental strategy. Europe is full of dense, 
disaffected colonies of Muslims with their own grievances.  But the U.S. has none. The 
FBI even recently declared in a secret memo that they had no evidence of al Qaeda 
cells in the U.S.69   
 DHS may even have reduced our protection from our two other types of disaster, 
natural and industrial. While DHS promulgates an “all-hazards” approach, hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 prompted inquiries that disclosed substantial funds were diverted 
from programs aimed at natural disasters to those focused on potential terrorist 
attacks. First responder funds, for example, were cut. Funds for anti-terrorist efforts 
(improved documentation requirements; watch lists; surveillance of mosques, ports, 
airports and public buildings; and many of the disturbing provisions of the PATRIOT 
Act) do not always help with the other hazards. Funds for bio-chemical suits and 
radiation detection were spent in areas where there is no industrial activity that might 
be a source of such danger.   
 Still, we have a porous society, far less protected (and less inconvenienced) than 
our European allies and Israel. A few suicide bombers coordinated to blow up tunnels, 
bridges, and airports in our congested and concentrated transportation system would 
panic our government, and it would be easy to shut down the Northeast power grid for 
weeks with a few well-placed, small explosions. Suitcase bombs in a chemical plant 
(they are still poorly protected) could easily put seven million people at risk. Tank cars 
with ninety tons of deadly chlorine routinely go by or even park near the centers of our 
cities, Washington, D.C. included, and are vulnerable to a small bomb. A drive-by 
attack on the spent fuel cooling tank at a nuclear power station could release, in 
minutes, more radiation than is held in the core. I do not foresee attacks on these by 
terrorists, but weather and industrial accidents (including simple road and rail 
accidents) can cause them. Even if there were no foreign terrorists, these are awesome 
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targets and DHS has done little to protect us from attacks on them. The awesome size 
of these targets is of our own making, made large and vulnerable for reasons of small 
economies and unwillingness to have a few inconveniences Very little is being done, 
and can be done, about all three threats, without basic reductions of our 
vulnerabilities.70 
 Unfortunately, we cannot look to DHS for action on this score, nor, it seems, from 
Congress and the White House. A reduction of our vulnerabilities would also be a very 
difficult project, perhaps more difficult than (and almost as improbable as) a 
reasonable defense against terrorism, but I think not.      
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Correction: May 9, 2006 
On page 16, the author states: Then it was learned that some 9/11 terrorists used 
Canada as a port of entry.  This should read: While al Qaeda terrorists have used 
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The technological ability to distinguish drug plants from other plant types has im-
portant implications for law enforcement (LE), wildfire recovery, reservoir protection,
environmental impact, agricultural issues, and military concerns. This ability, termed
“deconvolution,” can be a valuable technological tool to fight drug trafficking and thus
the war on terror. The use of computers and associated hardware, as well as data-base
and high-speed computing capabilities, are an integral part of the technological process
that will facilitate and make possible plant species identification from airborne sensors.
This paper will focus on utilizing Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and/or hyperspectral
imagery coupled to a neural network to successfully achieve deconvolution. The proposed
approach can be accomplished from (individually or combined) an airborne platform (air-
plane or satellite) and using a hyperspectral sensor or SAR. To ensure practical use and
direct technology transfer for homeland security purposes, for example, the DEA (Drug
Enforcement Agency), the technology and methodology is directly applied to a UAV (un-
manned aerial vehicle) collection platform.
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partners.
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INTRODUCTION  
The primary reason terrorists have become involved in smuggling drugs is to finance 
their operations.1 During the past few years an estimated 500 metric tons of cocaine 
entered the U.S. each year from countries in Latin America, specifically Bolivia, 
Columbia, Guyana, and Peru.2 Marijuana also enters in large quantities and is also grown 
across the U.S. in hidden fields, mixed with other plants, which makes it difficult to 
detect. Drug enforcement costs have become overwhelming. To make matters more 
complex, a new combination of drug and weapons smuggling and links to terrorist groups 
on both the southern border with Mexico and the northern border with Canada have 
become serious issues. Towns such as Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, along the Texas border, 
have erupted in violence, spilling that violence into the U.S. and creating a homeland and 
national security issue.  
News reports are beginning to highlight incidents of terrorists who are reportedly 
being smuggled into the U.S. accompanied by drugs and explosives. Recently, Mokhtar 
Haouari, a 31-year-old Algerian, was arrested in Canada and indicted in the U.S. as the 
central figure in a group of Algerians suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the U.S. 
He was linked to Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested in Port Angeles, Washington, in 
December 2005 while trying to smuggle explosives and bomb components from Canada, 
and to Abdel Ghani Meskini of Brooklyn, who was identified as Ressam's accomplice.3
Officials are pointing to records in a South Texas drug case with alleged terrorist ties they 
say underscores the lack of preparedness here. The attorney for a jailed Gulf Cartel 
member cited in the incident says his client was falsely accused of trying to smuggle Iraqi 
terrorists into this country and maintains charges were brought to increase the punishment 
for a drug offense against the accused.4 More recently, an enormous cache of weapons 
was seized in Laredo, Texas. U.S. authorities grabbed two completed Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs), materials for making thirty-three more, military-style 
grenades, twenty-six grenade triggers, large quantities of AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifles, 
as well as other weapons and components. The Val Verde County chief deputy warned 
that drug traffickers are aiding terrorists with possible al Qaeda ties to cross the Texas-
Mexico border into the United States. A government spokesman in Houston said “at this 
point there is no connection with anything in Iraq.”5
The link between drug smuggling, the financing of terrorist groups from those 
smuggled drugs, as well as increasing reports of weapons and terrorists being smuggled 
across U.S. borders, has become obvious. This situation illustrates the need to develop 
new technologies capable of detecting drugs being grown in the countries of our southern 
neighbors. Coupled with cooperative agreements between the DEA and other U.S. law 
enforcement groups and our southern neighbors, this ability would greatly decrease the 
financing capabilities of the terrorists and cartels (since the plants, even before 
processing, are the foundation of their capital enterprise) by preventing the processing of 
those drugs by detecting and destroying them. 
The combination of drug trafficking and weapons smuggling by illegal immigrants 
and potential terrorists causes both a law enforcement (LE) and a national security issue, 
placing an increased financial burden on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), LE agencies along the southern border, and other groups comprised of local and 
federal agencies. The technological ability to distinguish drug plants, especially before 
processing, from other plant types has important implications, not only for LE, but also 
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wildfire recovery, reservoir protection, environmental aspects, agricultural issues, and 
military concerns.  Thus, plant identification via un-mixing, termed “deconvolution,” can 
be a valuable technological tool in the war on terror. It can also prove to be a valuable 
tool in identifying other items, including people and weapons. 
 
REMOTE SENSING AND DECONVOLUTION 
To appreciate how deconvolution technology works, it is first necessary to understand a 
few basic principles about remote sensing and how to use commonly applied satellite and 
airborne sensing techniques to achieve our goal of deconvolution. 
Remote sensing is the science of acquiring information about the earth's surface, 
without actually being in contact with it, through sensing and recording reflected or 
emitted energy and processing, analyzing, and applying that information. Remote sensing 
involves the interaction between incident radiation and targets of interest that requires the 
systems and involvement of seven specific elements. It also involves the sensing of 
emitted energy and use of non-imaging sensors. The seven elements (see Figure 1) 
include:  
1)  Energy Source or Illumination: the first requirement for remote sensing is to 
have an energy source which illuminates or provides electromagnetic energy to 
the target of interest.  
2)  Radiation and the Atmosphere: as the energy travels from its source to the 
target, it will come in contact and interact with the atmosphere it passes through. 
This interaction may take place a second time as the energy travels from the target 
to the sensor.  
3)  Interaction with the Target: once the energy makes its way to the target through 
the atmosphere, it interacts with the target depending on the properties of both the 
target and the radiation.  
4)  Recording of Energy by the Sensor: a sensor is required (remote, not in contact 
with the target) to collect and record the electromagnetic radiation after the energy 
has been scattered by, or emitted from, the target.  
5)  Transmission, Reception, and Processing: the energy recorded by the sensor has 
to be transmitted, often in electronic form, to a receiving station where the data 
are processed by computer software into an image (hardcopy and/or digital).  
6)  Interpretation and Analysis: the processed image is interpreted, visually and/or 
digitally or electronically, to extract information about the illuminated target.  
7)  Application: the final element of the remote sensing process is achieved when we 
apply the information we have been able to extract (the data) from the imagery 
about the target to better understand, reveal some new information about, or assist 
in solving a specific problem. 
The energy that is sensed is electromagnetic radiation. The two characteristics of 
electromagnetic radiation that are particularly important for understanding remote 
sensing are wavelength and frequency. The wavelength (!) is the length (m) of one wave 
cycle (measured as the distance between successive wave crests).  
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Figure 1: The seven elements of remote sensing: (1) energy source illumination (passive or active 
– sun or satellite), (2) radiation, (3) interaction, (4) sensor recording, (5) transmission, (6) 
reception and processing, (7) interpretation and analysis and application.  
 
Frequency (Hz) refers to the number of cycles of a wave passing a fixed point per unit of 
time, equivalent to one cycle per second. Wavelength and frequency are related by the 
following formula:  
!"=c
where, c is speed of light (3x108 m/s) and " is frequency (cycles per second, Hz). Both !
and " are inversely related to each other through c. As the wavelength shortens, frequency 
increases and as the wavelength lengthens, the frequency decreases. Understanding the 
characteristics of electromagnetic radiation in terms of wavelength and frequency is 
important in understanding the information that can be extracted from remote sensing 
data.  
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Figure 2: Inverse relationship between wavelength and frequency. 
 
Opportunity for Improvement 
As technology has advanced, so have the sensors used on satellites and aircraft to sense 
the earth’s surface. In particular, the deployment of multispectral imagers (commonly 
called sensors) with a bandwidth of 100 nanometers (nm), has been improved on with the 
advent of hyperspectral sensors that have bandwidths of 10 nm; this is a significant 
advance in image resolution. Hyperspectral imagery provides sufficient spectral 
information to identify and distinguish between spectrally similar (but unique) material, 
thus more accurate and detailed information extraction from remotely sensed (RS) data is 
possible than from other types of RS data. Generally, hyperspectral imagery is utilized 
for target detection, material and mapping details of surface properties. For these specific 
applications hyperspectral imagery provides details and results not possible with other RS 
types of imagery. However, while there has been improvement, we are not yet able to 
distinguish with any degree of certainty the difference between plant types, for example, 
from an airborne platform. 
Information Technology Integral to Improvement 
The advent of the computer and associated hardware, as well as data-base and high-speed 
computing capabilities, has become an integral part of the technological process that will 
make plant species identification from airborne sensors a reality.  The standard 
multispectral image processing techniques generally developed to classify multispectral 
images into broad categories of surficial material, or a surface condition, have been 
inadequate for use in species identification.  The advent of hyperspectral imagery 
improved this in many respects.  However, to fulfill the potential for more detailed 
analysis of images, new image processing techniques were necessary.  Development and 
commercialization was made possible through a sequence of algorithms specifically 
designed to extract detailed information from hyperspectral imagery in the early to mid- 
1990s.6 The ability to further define hyperspectral images has led to four major 
objectives for this technology: 1) target detection; 2) material mapping; 3) material 
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identification; and 4) mapping surface property details. This research is primarily 
interested in target detection. In such projects investigators generally attempt to locate 
known target(s), which means the target must be distinguished from typically similar 
backgrounds or locating targets that are actually smaller than the nominal pixel size of the 
sensor. Hyperspectral imagery has been used successfully by the military to detect 
vehicles under vegetation camouflage and by agronomists to identify vegetation species.7
Despite this success, imagery details are insufficient for the purposes of deconvolution.  
Consequently, the technology used must be multifaceted (including the sensor) and must 
include image analysis and processing techniques, a unique and specific modeling 
approach, calibration and predictive analysis. 
Hyperspectral images are produced by instruments called imaging spectrometers. The 
development of these complex sensors has involved the convergence of two related but 
distinct technologies: spectroscopy and the remote imaging of Earth and planetary 
surfaces. Spectroscopy is the study of light emitted by or reflected from materials and its 
variation in energy with wavelength. Spectroscopy deals with the spectrum of sunlight 
that is diffusely reflected (scattered) by materials on the earth’s surface. Instruments 
called spectrometers (or spectroradiometers) are used to make ground-based or laboratory 
measurements of the light reflected from a test material. An optical dispersing element 
such as a grating or prism in the spectrometer splits this light into many narrow, adjacent 
wavelength bands and the energy in each band is measured by a separate detector. By 
using hundreds or even thousands of detectors, spectrometers can make spectral 
measurements of bands as narrow as 0.01 micrometers over a wide wavelength range, 
typically at least 0.4 to 2.4 micrometers (visible through middle infrared wavelength 
ranges).  
Remote imagers are designed to focus and measure the light reflected from many 
adjacent areas on the earth’s surface. In many digital imagers, sequential measurements 
of small areas are made in a consistent geometric pattern as the sensor platform moves 
and subsequent processing is required to assemble them into an image. Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SAR) is a method of microwave remote sensing where the motion of the 
radar is used to improve image resolution in the direction of the moving radar antenna. 
SAR imaging instruments support a wide range of commercial applications because of 
their ability to achieve very fine resolution from great distances. SAR instruments can 
penetrate through clouds, haze, smoke, and vegetation, while covering large areas of the 
earth. The active nature of SAR sensors means they can operate equally well in all 
lighting conditions, i.e., day/night, not requiring the smoothing normally necessary for 
optical imaging due to sun position or sun glint off reflective surfaces. Until recently, 
imagers were restricted to one, or a few, relatively broad wavelength bands by limitations 
of detector designs and the requirements of data storage, transmission, and processing. 
Recent advances in these areas have allowed the design of imagers that have spectral 
ranges and resolutions comparable to ground-based spectrometers. 
Around 1997, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) began investigating SAR 
as a method for regional assessment of soil moisture content (expressed in terms of #s on 
a volumetric content where s is degree of saturation).8 One of the most important aspects 
in deconvolution is the ability to minimize the influence of conditions that may hamper 
accuracy.  For example, initial studies are generally carried out on flat, uniformly 
vegetated sites to monitor the specific parameter of interest such as vegetation cover over 
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time.  The advantage of a flat site is that it avoids the complications associated with 
topography.  Choosing one site and monitoring it over time, rather than multiple sites 
(over space), minimizes the effects of small-scale surface roughness conditions that can 
result in less accuracy, especially if sensor resolution is low. Measuring through time thus 
allows quantification of the parameter of interest. In terms of plants, surface roughness is 
an important parameter, but can be taken into account by SAR backscatter through time; 
that is, a before and after image of the area. Effects of vegetation influence can then be 
corrected using empirical relationships, fitted or determined backscatter, and leaf area 
index (LAI). 
Several approaches have been suggested in attempts to identify specific vegetation 
types by deconvolution. In lay terms, any of these approaches can be thought of as 
“fancy” pattern recognition processes. However, these approaches have focused on only 
one plant attribute.  This means that the scientists have looked at only a singular 
methodology in an attempt to accomplish deconvolution instead of coupling a variety of 
techniques together to develop a more robust, accurate, and reliable solution. A recent 
approach was to use a nonlinear artificial neural network (pattern recognition through a 
training set), which achieved about eighty percent accuracy in identifying understorey (a 
mix of various plants growing beneath a tree canopy), but not plant types.9 An interesting 
result from application of a neural network approach is that the influences of understorey 
vegetation on remotely sensed data are of value to practical approaches to classifying 
understorey vegetation.  
As with all methods used to derive a solution to the deconvolution problem, any 
approach attempted will be a modeling approach whereby the investigator will test the 
correspondence between the predicted and surveyed distributions of data. The neural 
network approach is a spectral deconvolution method that has the ability to parse the 
proportional effects of individual canopy features from the radiance response of a single 
heterogeneous pixel.10 Neural networks are generally non-parametric data 
transformations that are not restricted by underlying assumptions due to pattern 
recognition, which means they can distinguish between nonlinear effects if a sufficient 
complex partitioning of the classification space is accounted for. Additionally, neural 
networks are termed “learning approaches;” thus they may be more likely to be trained or 
taught the complex variability in the signature because of varying canopy conditions, at 
least more so than traditional classifications. 
A neural network establishes spatial distribution with significant correspondence to 
independent data, which makes this a useful approach. However, such a process will not 
provide conclusive evidence as it typically produces trends or identities in the 
classification, but generally may lack discernable correlation of overstorey vegetation 
(the tree canopy that can be comprised of a wide variety of tree and/or shrub 
types/species) in a forested region to the existence of a specific plant type. The approach 
of a neural network is more capable of classifying minority features, adapting to the 
variable influences of changing canopy conditions while accounting for the nonlinear 
effects of the sub-canopy vegetation, and is thus unable to identify a specific plant type. 
The general problem with using a neural network approach is that one species will likely 
be too spectrally similar to another or cause an erroneous time-domain response so as to 
cause a false positive classification.   
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But there can also be false negatives in which co-occurring species mask understorey 
features or features of other species. As mentioned earlier, the observation of one basic 
attribute is not sufficient to address the problem of identifying a specific plant type from 
among a variety within the target zone. Thus, we should approach the problem from a 
broader perspective. Correlation among approaches, such as gathering data from other 
types of sensors and modeling approaches, can contribute to the analyses of any method 
and make parameterization of vegetation/understorey conditions more applicable.  Doing 
so will infer significant structural information such as biomass and vertical distribution 
that should differentiate between structurally distinct vegetation types from SAR and/or 
light detection and ranging (LIDAR).11 The fusion of increased biomass and structural 
information with signature information from optical sensor data could allow enhanced 
classification and biophysical parameterization. Given that this assumption is correct, the 
use of an artificial neural network in combination with multiple plant attribute data would 
yield the ability to extract the complex information available from optical remote sensing 
data, but only if these other procedures are coupled with the neural network. 
The methodology in this paper focuses on utilizing SAR/hyperspectral imagery to 
achieve deconvolution because it presents a unique opportunity for imaging plant types 
whether or not there is cloud cover, effectually making this process an all-weather one. 
Utilization of SAR will, at the minimum, identify the difference between trees versus 
common understorey shrubs and/or agricultural plants. One area that needs to be 
considered is the temporal and spatial variability (identification and removal) of the plant 
species being sensed, as well as their mix with other vegetation types. One problem that 
will arise with the data from SAR/hyperspectral sensor is quantification of the data, since 
initial estimates of the biomass/species present will generally not be stable due to 
intrinsic texture, system noise, and other environmental effects. Recent results from 
NASA’s Landsat Pathfinder project indicate that much of the vegetation, especially in 
areas of reforestation where drug crops are likely, is secondary vegetation (i.e., a wide 
mix of new growth of many plant species) which would be ideal for trials and tests.12 
Although traditional optical remote sensing techniques have been able to differentiate 
between cultivated areas, secondary vegetation, and pastures, these methods were limited 
in terms of mapping various stages of secondary growth and distinguishing separation of 
species. However, SAR backscatter from a vegetated target is a function of the dielectric 
properties of the vegetation, soil, surface roughness, and also the size and orientation of 
the scatterers (composed primarily of the leaves and branches) in relation to the imaging 
system. Despite this, SAR data lends the capability of charactering changes in vegetation 
structure and biomass changes, i.e., additional growth. In certain respects, multiple 
frequency and polarimetric SARs may provide estimates of biomass deconvolutive 
properties through a combination of higher frequency and shorter wavelength 
information, which would provide for increased backscatter and thus, better resolution. 
 
IMPROVING MEASUREMENT PROCESSES TO ACHIEVE 
DECONVOLUTION THROUGH A MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTE APPROACH 
Past efforts at recognizing specific plant types have failed because investigators limited 
themselves to a simple one-plant attribute, like leaf area index (LAI). The approach used 
for this paper uses multiple attributes and considers enhancing attributes through 
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deconvolution. The more conditions under which measured attributes can be defined and 
for which we train the pattern recognition algorithm, e.g. neural network, the higher the 
probability of success in identifying specific plant species when grouped together in a 
multiple plant mix. The proposed approach can be accomplished (individually or 
combined) from an airborne platform (airplane or satellite) and using a hyperspectral 
imager or SAR. The initial test and calibration phase could be performed from a crane or 
tower. 
The investigative problem is one of pattern recognition for which an algorithm is 
trained, i.e., learning based on training set.  In this case the algorithm would be a neural 
network and the training set is comprised of various plant attributes: the more 
information for training the higher likelihood for accuracy. Earlier it was mentioned 
plants undergo diffusive refraction when energy is reflected, refracted, and diffracted, 
i.e., bounced from a satellite. During this process, the algorithm will be trained for a 
hyperbola fit to a quadratic or polynomial equation. The raw data collected will either be 
from the time domain and/or frequency domain. This will allow transfer of time-space 
attributes by both frequency number and wave number domains. We can use the 
amplitude or phase spectrum with the wave number to train the algorithm to identify 
amplitude and phase. The algorithm can also be trained to identify time and frequency-
domain features.  By doing so, space can be transformed into a wave number. However, 
there is a ‘gotcha’ in that this process will work well for only one plant type.  For 
example, a field of corn, wheat, or even an entire field of marijuana may be easily 
identified using this approach.  However, general field conditions are such that there is 
always more than one type of plant species present. Thus, an enhanced design shift is 
necessary. 
Working with multiple plant species requires designing and applying a deconvolution 
operator (DO) to remove the effect of noise caused by other plants within a multiple plant 
mix or enhanced design shift. The DO can be designed in the frequency domain or the 
time domain (the Kalman Filter is an efficient recursive filter that estimates the state of a 
dynamic system from a series of incomplete and noisy measurements). Within the 
frequency domain, time can be divided for enhanced resolution. Since signal bandwidth 
is limited, the diffraction of the signal off the plant surface attenuates it, changing the 
signal and the frequency. The overall approach then is termed a linear system approach to 
designing a DO.  This approach can be illustrated by:   
S(t)  •  I(t)  =  O(t)  •  Convolution Operator  1 
where S, I, and O refer to signal response in, impulse response, and output response 




The impulse response, I(t) or filter, can be thought of as the DO, what some would refer 
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aspect, although the system is assumed to be linear, i.e., input # impulse # output, what 
occurs within the impulse box (transfer function) is very complex and generally highly 
nonlinear. If we wish to convert the system to a frequency approach it can be described 
as: 
 S(!) • I(!) = O(!) 2
where the parameters are the same as before, but read in terms of frequency ($).  In 










where I($) is the transfer function. However, because there are usually more than one 
plant species present, using output (O($)) as an example, the equation would be written 
as  
 O(!) = O1(!) + O2(!) + On+1(!) 4












Once a component is removed, i.e., O1($), equation 5, it can be transferred back to a time 
domain function to look for the same attribute, i.e., to place into the algorithm for 
recognizing/learning the new signal in a different domain. Once the required data are 
collected from the sensor, the above modeling approach is applied recursively using high-
speed computers to deconvolute the plant mix.  Although explained in relatively 
simplistic terms, the process is quite complex. The end result is that one is able to identify 
the specific plant type within the sensor’s resolution area. As an example, DEA agents 
could identify coca plants (from which cocaine is manufactured) or marijuana plants from 
a distance without initial personal risk to the agents involved and then proceed per policy 
mandates. 
 
DATA COLLECTION PLATFORM 
Processing collected data and the technology used to do so accurately as described above 
are only small steps in the process. Ideally, a collection platform for LE or homeland 
security purposes should be reliable, portable, easy to operate, and functional in any 
geographic region. There are several methods possible for data acquisition. The preferred 
choice would be via satellite or fixed-wing aircraft. However, because the goal of this 
research is to be directly applicable to fighting terrorism and supporting homeland 
security, it is believed that although less stable, a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle, 
sometimes also referred to as an RPV, a remotely piloted vehicle) is the best practical 
methodology to use this coupled technology. Therefore, this research will focus on 
mounting either an SAR or hyperspectral sensor aboard a small UAV. A suitable UAV 
would be the Silver Fox (Figure 3), developed by Advanced Ceramics Research in 
Arizona, utilizing a hyperspectral sensor developed by Resonon in Bozeman, Montana. A 
combination of the small UAV and hyperspectral sensor will adequately prove the 
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research hypothesis and set the ground work for a functional system directly deliverable 
and proven to the DEA, DHS, or related LE group. It should also be noted that the UAV 
described is not the multi-million dollar “Predator” type used by the military and is much, 
much less costly. 
 
Figure 3: UAV (Silver Fox developed by Advanced Ceramics Research – photo used by 
permission) weighing twenty-seven pounds.  This UAV is capable of thirty-five knots average 
speed, eight hours in flight mission time, 12,000 foot service ceiling, and a five pound payload. 
The UAV is inaudible at 700 feet and almost undetectable to the naked eye at 1,500 feet. It can 
also be launched from any site utilizing a portable launcher and requires no runway for 
recovery. 
Budget 
The costs to correctly set up, test, and calibrate such a system (Table 1) are small 
compared to the potential use and value-added results of the technology and its effect on 
the drug war; they also include the necessary resources for a required team of three 
during a six month period. However, once the system is fully tested and calibrated, it 
could be delivered intact to any LE group, fully operational and functional since it would 
be software driven. 
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Table 1: Projected Budget for Technology Development 
Description Quantity Cost $ 
Personnel Team1 3 165,000 
Site Preparation & 
Agronomic Work 
3 sites each unmixed 




Silver Fox UAV2 1 103,000 
Sensor Equipment3 Hyperspectral Sensor 22,000 
Miscellaneous   
Equipment and Supplies 
 12,500 
TOTAL  309,500 
1Includes IT set up (airborne number crunching ability), computer modeling, testing, validation of data, and all 
personnel time necessary to complete data collection, analysis, and modeling other than equipment uses. 
2Includes UAV, ground station, GPS navigation, real time video, portable launcher, and pilot training. 
3Add $38k for SAR. 
 
Advantages 
The major advantages of this technology are that it can accurately identify a specific plant 
type mixed among other plants from a safe distance, e.g. coca or marijuana, through use 
of multiple plant attributes and improved data modeling capabilities using neural 
networks and transfer functions to process the data. Utilizing the same modeling 
approach and delivery platform, an alternate methodology for deconvolution during 
daylight hours via a combination of the EO 10x camera and IR could be developed 
concurrently with little added cost; a significant value-added feature. During data 
acquisition and detection phase a DEA or other LE officer would not be in harm’s way. It 
is significantly cheaper than performing the research via satellite imagery or fixed wing 
aircraft for multiple date testing and a series of satellite images for each date. The UAV 
system discussed is more flexible, portable, can be operated from almost any geographic 
location, and also follow a prearranged flight path due to GPS capabilities. This particular 
UAV requires no runway for launch or recovery, is inaudible at 700 feet AGL (above 
ground level), and almost undetectable to the naked eye at 1,500 feet AGL. Data could 
either be processed in the recovery area or relayed to a ground processing station and 
processed similarly to that collected via other airborne systems; this technology is easily 
transferable.  Finally, perhaps the greatest advantage is that DEA or LE would get a 
system that has been proven, is functional, reliable, easy to operate out of the box, and 
gives the user immediate access and total control of the acquired data. Compared to 
satellite systems where reliance would be on the DoD and other government or 
commercial entities to supply necessary information, the latter may well be out of “the 
window of opportunity” for successful mission fulfillment, which would give this system 
a value-added benefit to the user.  
An alternative for agencies that already possess small manned aircraft is that costs 
would be limited to the purchase of only the required sensors and processing equipment, 
such as computers and other peripherals. Another advantage for this group would be that 
small manned aircraft can carry considerably more weight and a wider variety of sensors, 
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as well as sensors that have much better resolution (that typically weigh more than the 
suggested UAV can carry) and also give a day/night capability. However, the latter 
would significantly increase costs, likely equal to or greater than the proposed budget 
(Table 1).  
Limitations 
One disadvantage of a sensor/UAV coupled system, at least for the small UAV described 
and similar UAVs, is that it currently does not offer a SAR capability that would ensure 
all-weather operation due to the reduced payload capability of the small UAV system, i.e. 
Silver Fox.  Thus, a satellite platform would offer best performance in this regard or a 
fixed wing aircraft that many DEA groups and other LE groups already possess. 
However, a suitable SAR unit is scheduled to be available for this UAV in six to eight 
months. Also, because the UAV system is designed to fly closer to ground level for data 
acquisition, the enhanced capabilities of an SAR from a satellite are a trade-off with the 
enhanced resolution of the hyperspectral sensor from the short distances of 500-1200 feet 
AGL. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage in CONUS is the restriction imposed by the FAA 
for UAVs, which requires permission to fly any UAV when exceeding 500 feet AGL. 
The regulations are not yet fully developed, but should be by September 2006.14 Also, the 
FAA has granted a national certificate of authorization to the USAF, which implies the 
USAF may become a necessary partner with DEA or other CONUS LE agencies, as well 
as foreign LE agencies in Latin America. Altitude level may not be a disadvantage in 
foreign countries, but is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Future Research 
Increases in technology, which is easily accessible to criminals and terrorists, will force 
LE agencies to maintain a technological advantage as drugs, weapons, and terrorist 
smuggling activities become more prevalent, especially along the southern U.S. border 
with Mexico. The situation between homeland security agencies and problems along the 
border will inevitably become increasingly more complex and adversarial. Thus, initial 
future research should focus on improving current sensor technology so that lighter-
weight sensors can be utilized, which will allow additional payload space for other 
sensors in which the primary mission of the UAV would be surveillance. The focus 
should also be on enhanced software and systems to develop fully autonomous 
capabilities. Also, the UAV should be strategically utilized in a multi-layered detection, 
prevention, and enforcement policy. 
 
APPLICATION TO DEA, BORDER PATROL AND OTHER AGENCIES 
For homeland security there are multiple applications for these small UAVs, which are 
also being developed in rotary-wing form, i.e., small helicopters that weigh about 200 
pounds with an approximate length (with rotor) of twelve feet. Unmanned aerial vehicles 
can serve as the “eyes and ears” along the southern border, which could reduce border 
enforcement costs. They are almost impossible to see, quiet, and not easily targeted by 
hostiles. As technology quickly improves, real-time images will help pinpoint smuggling 
and drug operations that the U.S. Border Patrol, DEA, DHS or another appropriate 
agency could quickly respond to, whether along the border or with our southern partners, 
12 Homeland Security Affairs Vol.  [2006], No. 1, Article 4
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volII/iss1/art4
and allow rapid response. Ideally the UAV systems would be synched with current border 
camera-surveillance systems to gain view distance; because the UAV is at a higher 
altitude, detection can occur while smugglers or other personnel are far from the border, 
allowing U.S. Border Patrol agents ample time for a suitable response.  
With the development of small rotor (small helicopter) UAVs, the ability to hover 
over a given area for several hours without being seen would be of enormous benefit for 
detecting not only vegetation, but also personnel and tactical operations. Other uses 
would be for the U.S. Coast Guard in ship inspections at sea, tracking/following ships 
into harbor, and search and rescue operations that cover a localized area, since the UAVs 
can fly a specific pattern and even a small vessel could carry and launch them. There are 
also a variety of classified uses, as well as uses by other agencies, including fire fighting 
observation, reservoir protection, power grid distribution surveillance, and others. The 
primary advantage for all these uses is cost, since the cost to fly a UAV of the type 
explained in this report is approximately ninety percent less per hour than a full-sized 
fixed or rotary-wing aircraft.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper focused on utilizing SAR and/or hyperspectral imagery to achieve 
deconvolution of plant species coupled with a neural network and a modeling approach to 
separately identify individual plant species and utilizing a UAV airborne platform to 
collect the necessary data. The more conditions under which measured attributes can be 
defined and for which we train the pattern-recognition algorithm, e.g. neural network, the 
higher the probability of success for identifying specific plant species when grouped 
together in a multiple plant mix. The proposed approach can be accomplished from 
(individually or combined) an airborne platform (airplane or satellite) and using a 
hyperspectral imager or SAR. The initial test and calibration phase could be performed 
from a crane or tower. During the data collection and analysis process, the algorithm will 
be trained for a hyperbola fit to a quadratic or polynomial equation. The raw data 
collected will either be from the time domain and/or frequency domain. This will allow 
transfer of time-space attributes by both frequency number and wave number domains. 
Either the amplitude or phase spectrum with the wave number can be used to train the 
algorithm to identify amplitude and phase. To make this approach a reality requires 
setting up a variety of field plots with specific plant types and plant ratios and the design 
of a deconvolution operator (DO) to remove the effect of noise caused by other plants in 
a multiple plant mix. This deconvolution methodology is not only useful for LE purposes, 
but also has applications to wildfire recovery, reservoir protection, environmental 
aspects, agricultural issues, and militarily.   
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Not a whit, we defy augury. There's a special providence in the fall of a 
sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come. If it be not to come, it will be now. 
If it be not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all.                               
Hamlet, 5.2, 217-20. 
 William Shakespeare   
 
INTRODUCTION 
The growing field of homeland security and disaster studies is practical. Its theories and models are 
linked to specific problems and contingencies. Besides studies in public policy, law, law enforcement, 
emergency response, and relevant applied sciences (both civilian and military), the academic side of this 
subject might support investigations in sociology, psychology, anthropology and history, while literature 
and journalism could help flesh out its human face. Art, music, architecture, theater, film and dance can 
all reflect and shape the anticipation of disasters and our reactions to them.  Academic philosophy, with 
its focus on analysis, argumentation, and criticism of common sense (not to mention its pettifogging 
obsession with the abstract and abstruse) hardly seems relevant.  
But academic philosophy could make an important contribution to homeland security and disaster 
studies while at the same time adding another relevant subject to its own “applied” subfields.
1
Although philosophers are specialists in critical thinking, the perspective of philosophers tends to be 
that of ordinary people who are neither government officials nor public policy planners. Much of the 
professional literature on homeland security and disaster is written from the perspective of existing 
leaders and officials, with the result that civilians or the public are often regarded as the passive objects 
of actions taken by authorities to protect and assist them. And of course it is members of the public who 
are potentially the most numerous victims of those events that are properly called “disasters.”  The 
innocence of the civilian public occasions the “terror” evoked by terrorism, and the public’s absorption 
in daily routines sets it up as victims of catastrophe in earthquakes and floods.  Despite the abstraction 
and abstruseness of philosophical discourse, it should be understood that as civilians and members of 
the public themselves, philosophers share the ordinary perspective on disaster. This is a wary and 
sometimes fearful perspective.
2
It comes from a sense of being unprepared and lacking the knowledge 
and skill to either become prepared on one’s own or justify demands for official assistance.  
In this paper I will suggest two dimensions through which contemporary academic philosophers 
might develop a contribution to disaster studies, from the standpoint of the public: social contract 
theory and moral theory.  I will then conclude with brief suggestions about additional philosophical 
approaches to disaster studies.  I begin with several assumptions about disasters, and one caveat. Here 
are the assumptions. A disaster is an event that harms or kills a significant number of people or 
otherwise severely impairs or interrupts their daily lives in civil society. Disasters may be natural, or 
the result of accidental or deliberate human action.  Disasters include but are not limited to: fires, 
floods, storms, earthquakes, chemical spills, leaks of or infiltration by toxic substances, terrorist attack 
by conventional, nuclear or biological weapons, epidemics, pandemics, and mass failures in electronic 
communications. Disasters always occasion surprise and shock; they are unwanted by those affected by 
them, although not always unpredictable. In this sense, the effects of war on civilian populations may 
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be disastrous, although wars have elements of agency, systematic planning, and the active involvement 
of legitimate government, which distinguish them from disasters.  
The caveat is that I cannot speak for all or even a few philosophers, because philosophers always 
disagree. It is exactly disagreement among philosophers that sustains innovation in our discipline, 
because it “furthers the discussion.” So my hope here is to introduce a new subject to philosophers and 
at the same time suggest how philosophers might contribute to an existing discipline.  
 
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE SECOND STATE OF NATURE 
The philosophical idea of a social contract at the foundation of civil society, or society under 
government, dates back to John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau in the eighteenth century and most recently, John Rawls during the second half of the 
twentieth century.
3
Hobbes and Locke are pertinent to the most general thought about disaster in 
political philosophy, whereas Rousseau is relevant to public policy ideas concerning the ethics of 
disaster preparation, prevention and response, and Rawls offers key insights that are useful for 
considering social justice issues in disaster. The focus in this section will be on Locke and Hobbes. 
 The social contract is an explicit or implicit agreement among citizens which justifies the 
formation of government and emphasizes the rights of citizens in their relationship to government. 
Social contract theory posits those rights of citizens that are prior to and more fundamental than the 
organization of society under government. Such rights are presumed in the United States’ Declaration 
of Independence and protected by the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution.   
The ultimate justification for the existence of government according to social contract theory is that 
government makes life better for those governed. Locke and Hobbes used the idea of a state of nature, 
or a description of human life without government, to give a historical account of how government 
came to be, and to explain the benefits of government. Both Hobbes and Locke assumed that there was 
an original ungoverned condition of humankind in the state of nature. Locke thought humans were 
cooperative and industrious in the state of nature, whereas Hobbes thought their lives were solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
4
Both Locke and Hobbes implied that even if there never were a state of nature in human history, 
positing it afforded political theorists an idea of human life without government, to which human life 
with government could be compared and justified. That comparison and justification is the main theme 
of social contract theory. Social contract theory requires that government not be accepted as inevitable 
and beyond the control of those governed, but that its very existence requires the consent of those 
governed. This consent constitutes a social contract that places specific obligations on government. 
 Because life was tolerable in a state of nature according to Locke, he had a minimal view of 
government functions which were limited to: the protection of private property, the unbiased 
settlement of disputes, punishment of criminals domestically, and protection from foreign enemies.
5
Although Locke emphasized the importance of protecting private property, his notion of property was 
robust, because it extended to life and liberty as well as material possessions (or what he called 
“estate”).
6
By contrast, Hobbes believed that the competitive and aggressive nature of human beings 
required strong (what we would consider despotic) central authority, to enforce the peace.
7
As a result, 
Locke defined the social contract as an agreement between citizens and their rulers, whereas Hobbes 
thought that the social contract was an agreement among citizens to give up their own rights to make 
war on each other and, at the same time, make an irrevocable gift of those rights to an absolute ruler or 




Hobbes and Locke shared a strong conviction that the powers of government derived from the 
powers and consent of those governed. Locke, insofar as he thought society could exist without 
government, believed if government collapsed, its powers would revert to the people, but if society 
collapsed, government would no longer exist.
9
Hobbes thought the gift of power to government by 
those who would be governed was irrevocable and there could not be anything resembling peaceful 
and cooperative society without government.
10
 Both Locke and Hobbes were addressing the doctrine 
of the divine right of kings in the seventeenth century and they spoke to the interests of a new 
mercantile and capitalist economic group not previously represented in European governments. 
Because rulers did not derive their right to rule from God, but from the people, according to both 
Locke and Hobbes, social contract theory has been understood as a secular political theory. Still, this is 
not to say that the most fundamental principles of government are independent of beliefs about Natural 
Law, which consisted of God’s rules for men in the state of nature, or independent of moral intuitions 
from other sources. Both Locke and Hobbes began with Natural Law in constructing their theories 
about the role of government and its justification. The difference between them was that Locke thought 
humankind obeyed the first principle of Natural Law, that they not harm one another, whereas Hobbes 
thought humans were incapable of keeping the peace without government.
11
 
Locke endured as the political philosopher for the foundation of American democracy in those 
documents and legal traditions that both protect the rights of individuals and provide a method of 
decision-making via majority rule. Locke held that citizens are entitled to representation in a legislative 
body and that the decision of the majority is binding on all citizens.
12
 For example, no matter how 
divided votes are along party lines, the winning candidates in American presidential elections become 
presidents of those who voted for their opponents, as well as those who voted for them.  However, 
Hobbes’ view of the warlike and dangerous nature of human beings in conditions without government 
seems to have provided the most prudent description of what can happen domestically when 
government breaks down. Both thinkers remain highly relevant to thinking about disaster.  
It is presently inconceivable, and probably beyond the scope of political theory, that any disaster 
could result in the total and permanent failure of government as we know it.
13
 However, the temporary 
dysfunction of government in responding to some disasters, and different abilities of citizens to prepare 
for or effectively respond to disasters without functional government, raise fundamental political 
questions that bring us back to Locke and Hobbes. At first, it may seem as though conditions under 
which individual survival requires private measures are a return to a state of nature, however 
temporarily. But this is not the literal case because present social and material structures have not only 
removed us from an original condition, but made it very difficult to return to one in a short period of 
time. The inability to self-subsist in the absence of government characterizes urban subcultures in the 
U.S., such as parts of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, and also rural communities in parts of the 
world that have not yet fully industrialized. Many residents of the Ninth Ward of New Orleans 
remained displaced and unable to return home months after Katrina and in the Kashmir district after 
the 2005 Pakistan earthquake millions were homeless months later. Moreover, disasters that cause 
great physical destruction leave victims without the most basic survival ingredients in their immediate 
environments, rural or urban. 
The destruction of an existing society’s material basis of human life does not return human beings 
to an original state of nature, because it does not return them to conditions under which self-sufficient 
survival is possible. It is not possible to “return” to some manner of “living off the land” after most 
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modern disasters. However, the conditions of immediate environmental privation during the time 
period in which government is not functioning normally to repair material conditions, qualify as a 
second state of nature.
The question in terms of social contract theory is this: What does government owe citizens in 
situations in which government is temporarily dysfunctional, that is, in the second state of nature?  If 
property is privately owned or owned by the local community, government does not owe restitution to 
citizens who have lost their property or had it destroyed. But as part of government’s benevolence, it is 
appropriate that it offer some compensation in those cases, much as a good neighbor might. The 
material resources of government in democratic capitalistic countries are the results of taxation, so 
such compensation amounts to some members of society helping other members who have sustained 
losses through no fault of their own. However, there is a more fundamental issue raised by the inability 
of citizens to systematically prepare for or take an active role in the response to disaster.  
The material base of modern industrial society is a dynamic system kept in motion by exchanges 
through commerce. Orderly private commerce indirectly depends on systems of government regulation 
and oversight, while utilities such as power, transportation and clean water and air, as well as 
protection and security, are more directly dependent on government oversight. These indirect and 
direct dependencies on government have been broadly and deeply institutionalized in the very ways 
that render even a temporary return to an original state of nature impossible. Even if a disaster did not 
make it impossible to “live off the land” and the land itself were intact, a disaster can still make it 
impossible for citizens to function normally in society without government, because their functioning 
in society has come to require the functions of government. In addition to the first destruction and 
disruption attending disasters, there is a second more profound breakdown in civil society which is 
made worse by the dysfunction of government.  For example, it is bad when people are killed but 
worse when their remains cannot be removed; unfortunate when people are injured, but cause for 
despair when medical treatment is unavailable. Such conditions are part of the disadvantages of life in 
a second state of nature, when government function has been interrupted by disaster. And the inability 
of civilians to create, in a short period of time, a useful social condition that will sustain their lives 
entails that the second state of nature may more resemble a brutal Hobbesian condition than a peaceful, 
cooperative and productive Lockean community. 
The second state of nature in disasters is only a temporary condition without government. The 
usual justifications for government are not put in question by it, but rather second states of nature 
create conditions in which many citizens accept, and some actively welcome, unusually strong 
expressions of government authority (for example, martial law). It has been demonstrated countless 
times that private individuals, institutions and companies are unable to maintain effective long-term 
preparations for disaster response, or to refrain from high-risk activities in terms of future disasters. 
Social scientists and public policy experts refer to stages in disaster response that range from high 
readiness to complacent ignorance as the time span after any particular disaster increases.
14
 Structures 
washed away in floods may be replaced by more expensive ones which are just as vulnerable, brick 
buildings may not be retro-fitted in the face of earthquake predictions, local emergency response 
resources are at the mercy of fluctuating budgets, individuals may misplace, use up or fail to procure 
emergencies supplies, and so forth.  
However, the general failure in civilian disaster preparation does not in itself imply that 
government must be the preparer or responder of last resort. Such a “last resort” role is not, strictly 
speaking, an obligation of government. Any obligation of government concerning second states of 
4 Homeland Security Affairs Vol.  [2006], No. 1, Article 5
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volII/iss1/art5
nature would have to stem from the basic principles of social contract theory. The argument based on 
social contract theory for the obligation of government to prepare for and respond to disaster would go 
like this: Government has a continual obligation to benefit those governed by rendering them better off 
than they would have been in the first state of nature. The temporary dysfunction of government in 
disasters results in a second state of nature for those governed. Therefore, government has an extended 
obligation to render citizens better off than they may be in a second state of nature. That is, government 
is obligated to ensure adequate disaster preparation and planning, for all probable disasters, in precisely 
those ways in which the public has demonstrated its inabilities. The scholarly foundations for such an 
obligation would consist of new work in political science, political philosophy, and law.  
A public policy analyst might comment here that sound legal and philosophical reasoning is all 
well and good, but it does not tell us how government could fulfill new social contract theory 
obligations, in addition to policies that are already in place. A partial answer to the question of the 
usefulness of the kind of new political theory proposed is that a new theory may suggest new practices. 
A view of emergency preparation as a fundamental obligation of government could motivate new 
policies. It might, for example, lead to more encouragement of private companies to produce adequate 
supplies, educational products, and services that are appropriate to modern disasters.  A variety of 
locale-specific disaster kits could be permanently on sale in supermarkets and chain stores.
15
 
Standardized region-specific training courses could be required as curricula at all levels of the 
educational system. The insurance industry could be extended to include disaster logistics insurance,
so that localities, institutions, campuses, and corporate and residential complexes register with 
companies outside of their locales the kinds of information necessary for the co-ordination of 
emergency and relief efforts. (Such distant “command centers” would be able to assess injuries and 
damages, and locate and facilitate the delivery of appropriate supplies and services more quickly than 
could be done from close but damaged centers.)
16
 Development of projects of this nature is within the 
existing functions of the federal executive and legislature, through tax-cut incentives. (And because 
they would be incentives to produce new goods and services, they would not represent a decrease in 
existing revenues.)  
 
MORAL THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN DISASTER  
The ultimate test of political principles, including those principles underlying social contract theory, is 
whether they are morally right. If political principles are not morally right then political life becomes a 
matter of force, rhetoric, and coercion. Many of the functions of government also need to withstand a 
moral test because moral matters are those issues and events in which human harm or well-being is at 
stake. In the Western philosophical tradition, the intrinsic value of human beings is the basic intuition 
that underlies all moral actions and moral reasoning. It amounts to the same thing whether human 
beings are considered valuable because they have been created in God’s image, or whether the value of 
human beings is a purely secular intuition, independent of religion; Government principles and actions 
that result in harm to human beings or do not respect the value of human life require extensive 
justification.  
While morality is often associated with religion in contemporary culture, ever since Plato 
philosophers have relied on a secular, rational definition of morality. As Plato recounts it, when 
Socrates was on the way to his trial for “corrupting the youth of Athens” by asking questions of leaders 
that revealed the ignorance of those leaders, he met Euthyphro. Euthyphro was on his way to prosecute 
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his own father for the death of his servant and Socrates engaged him in a dialogue about moral 
goodness. Euthyphro, who believed his action was just, said justice or goodness is what pleases God. 
Socrates then asked Euthyphro whether something is morally good because God approves of it, or 
whether God approves of it because it is morally good. This is a dilemma, because if one assents to the 
first alternative, it becomes necessary to explain why God is a source of moral goodness while in the 
second alternative, goodness is independent of God and must be defined. Socrates favored the second 
alternative and since that time Western philosophers have been trying to pin down exactly what it is 
that makes an action right, or a person good.
17
 The main result has been three systems of morality: 
virtue or character ethics; deontology or duty ethics; and consequentialism or utilitarianism. Let’s take 
them in turn.  
 Aristotle offered a comprehensive account of virtues in his Nichomachean Ethics, which has not 
required much revision in over two thousand years. According to Aristotle, virtue is a rational activity 
of the soul. It is neither determined nor precluded by nature, but requires both childhood training and 
adult practice. There are many virtues or desirable traits of character, such as courage, benevolence, 
generosity, righteous indignation. A virtue is a disposition to do the right thing in a concrete real-life 
situation, and to do it for the right reasons, in the right way, and as a result of a well-developed trait of 
character. A trait of character that is named by a virtue is created by acting in accordance with the 
virtue. Thus, a person develops courage by performing courageous acts and part of what makes an 
action courageous is that it is done by a courageous person. This is not a circular process because it is 
assumed that individuals first begin to develop their characters while they are children, as the result of 
training. Indeed, Aristotle thought that a society has to be virtuous to further virtues in individuals and 




Immanuel Kant began his moral theory with the insight that the only thing in the world good 
without qualification is a good will, or benevolence. Kant developed deontology, or duty ethics, on the 
basis of his idea of the categorical imperative. Kant offered two main formulations of the categorical 
imperative. The first is: Act so that the generalization or maxim of your action can be willed by you to 
be a general rule. (This formulation of the categorical imperative is not the same as The Golden Rule, 
which requires only that one be willing to be a recipient of how one acts, and not that one wants 
everyone to act the same way.) Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative is: Never treat 
another human being as a means, but always treat others and oneself, as ends.
19
 
Kant contrasted the categorical imperative with hypothetical imperatives that could be directives to 
act in specific ways to achieve specific results. The categorical imperative admits of no exceptions 
because it is the foundation for action by rational beings, each of which has intrinsic worth as an end, 
and is a sovereign being with free will as a member of “the kingdom of ends.”
20
 Kant also developed 
ideas of specific duties, such as truthfulness, integrity and generosity, which did not admit of 
exceptions and were never relative. The biggest weakness of Kant’s system is that he offered no rules 
for ranking duties or deciding which to fulfill when two or more duties conflict. 
Consequentialism is the contemporary version of utilitarianism that was developed by Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
21
 Utilitarianism is the principle that the ultimate good is always the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number of sentient beings, whereby everyone, including the moral 
agent, counts for one unit and no one counts for more than one. Bentham did not distinguish between 
happiness and pleasure, although Mill attempted to do so by distinguishing between higher pleasures, 
such as friendship and the appreciation of art, and lower pleasures, which are mainly physical. Mill 
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argued that higher pleasures are better, because they are more enduring and those individuals who have 
tried both kinds of pleasure prefer the higher pleasures.
22
 Consequentialism is more abstract than 
utilitarianism because its followers talk about maximizing consequences: an action is good if it has 
good consequences, so when we maximize, we are increasing the good consequences. (However, 
consequentialists often leave open what the good consequences are and in principle there could be a 
version of consequentialism that is the opposite of utilitarianism in that it seeks to maximize human 
misery and pain.) 
Virtue ethics, duty ethics, and consequentialism are all relevant to disaster prevention and response. 
There are always individuals who perform virtuous acts in disasters, that is, heroes.  People have duties 
in disasters; for example, parents must save their children.  The consequences to human well-being are 
primary factors in deciding what to do in disasters.  In fact, most moral philosophers are already 
familiar with thinking about disasters because they often use them as hypothetical situations in order to 
show how their moral systems are superior, which is to say more consistent and comprehensive, to 
those of their opponents. Deontologists often criticize consequentialists by describing situations in 
which actions that maximize consequences are morally wrong.  Examples have included the torture of 
children to get information from hardened adult terrorists, and killing individuals so that others may 
survive or to preserve the peace of communities.
23
 Consequentialists have responded in one of two 
ways. Either they have tried to show that long-term thinking about consequences does not commit 
them to committing morally repugnant acts, or else they have directly argued that morally repugnant 




Some thinkers have claimed that the use of disaster scenarios does not provide valid examples for 
moral reasoning because they are improbable and do not reflect the real choices and meanings that 
most people experience in their lives.
25
 Such a generalization would seem to depend on the nature of 
the times. In times such as our own, that seem to have more than their fair share of disasters, it is 
important for philosophers to develop applications of their moral systems that are specifically relevant 
to the extreme conditions of disasters. It may be difficult to determine whether individuals should be 
held morally accountable for legal actions that result in harm to others during times of disaster, or what 
such accountability would entail. But insofar as, and according to social contract theory, governments 
are obligated to prepare for or respond to disasters, it is important to be able to refer to moral principles 
that do or do not justify specific government actions.  
It is important to engage in moral reasoning about new laws and the actions of officials in times of 
disaster. Recent headlines of such actions undertaken in the Global War on Terrorism have provided 
examples that are more extreme than even the bizarre scenarios cooked up by philosophers. There 
have, for instance, been situations in which police or military officials immediately killed suspected 
suicide bombers, because the detonation of a bomb would cause certain death and injury to the public 
or their colleagues.
26
 When such suspects turn out to have been unarmed, questions about moral theory 
arise. We know that the officials were acting in accordance with their duties or orders, which were in 
fulfillment of a general government obligation to protect the public. If there is a moral assumption that 
all human life is valuable, then killing a terrorist would be justified on consequentialist grounds, 
because more people will remain alive if the terrorist is killed. However, if the suspected terrorist turns 
out not to have been a terrorist, then killing him or her did not “maximize” good consequences, 
because it resulted in the death of one innocent individual who would otherwise have remained alive. 
Nonetheless, many would claim that shooting the suspected terrorist was, at the time of the shooting, 
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justified on consequentialist grounds, because those who decided to shoot the suspect had sufficient 
evidence that the lives of others were at stake. This leads to questions about what counts as sufficient 
evidence in urgent situations and whether or not urgency itself may be reason to revise evidence 
criteria. 
It is interesting that even when consequentialism is the preferred moral system, it is not so much 
actual consequences that determine moral worth, but what moral agents are justified in believing the 
consequences of their action or non-action will be. Thus, even though extreme situations may seem to 
call for consequentialist ethics, they may ultimately require virtue ethics because the right actions 
depend on abilities to deliberate rationally about probable outcomes in situations of great stress. Such 
skill in deliberation that leads to action is an example of the intellectual virtue of phronesis or practical 
reasoning, in an Aristotelian sense. It requires training and would have to manifest itself consistently to 
count as a trait of character, or a desirable professional skill.
27
 
It has already been suggested that in disasters the practice of virtues is constrained by pre-existing 
duties.  And it seems to go without saying that in disaster preparation, prevention, and response, the 
goal is to maximize human life. A task is thereby set for moral philosophers to develop new ways of 
combining virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism, so that we can all lucidly evaluate the 
morality of government actions in preventing and responding to disaster. 
 
FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS 
The applicability of social contract theory and moral theory to disaster studies barely scratches the 
surface of what the philosophical contribution might be. There are myriad specific ways in which 
philosophers working in applied areas could contribute to existing applied fields. Philosophers of 
science might take up the task of elucidating, for others in the humanities, studies by architects, 
geologists and engineers that are relevant to disasters. Medical ethicists could examine policies for 
triage, in all disasters, and isolation and triage in the advent of pandemics. Probability theorists might 
take a look at what it means to say something like, “The probability of a major earthquake in Cascadia, 
in the next fifty years, is five percent,” and similar predictions.
28
 Cultural critics who study the media 
might evaluate the specific contribution made by media to the public’s response to disaster. This is a 
small and vague list.  In developing the political and moral focus of the first two sections of this paper, 
it might be useful to now consider issues of social justice and finish up with a return to the 
philosophically motivating theme of the ordinary person’s fear, via a brief discussion of existentialism 
and disaster. 
Social Justice 
John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice begins with the premise that justice is the cardinal virtue of 
societies. The classic definition of justice, going back to ancient philosophy is: Treat equals equally. 
Rules, laws, and their applications are just if those who are already equal, in a relevant respect, receive 
the same treatment. This idea of justice as fairness is expanded by Rawls in his analysis of the 
foundations of a just society.
29
 Still, justice as fairness, which remains the classic definition after 
Rawls, is not the full story according to those humanistic thinkers who have addressed issues of 
inequality within society, particularly entrenched and inter-generational poverty, sexism, and racism. 
Social critics who have ideals of equal opportunities and equal possession of at least the basic 
necessities of life usually work with a concept of distributive justice, or some measure of sameness in 
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the distribution of some goods. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights relies on a 
conception of distributive justice in this sense.
30
 
However, in contemporary politics, the two ideas of justice as fairness and distributive justice often 
appear to be opposed. For instance, debates about the merits of social welfare programs and affirmative 
action may turn on questions of whether justice requires that those who are treated fairly according to 
the law, but nonetheless consistently end up disadvantaged, are entitled to some form of compensation. 
The compensation is assumed to work as a form of distributive justice, with the goal of making all 
citizens equally able to benefit from the formal equality guaranteed by the justice as fairness principle. 
But not everyone agrees about the necessity for compensation or distributive justice.  
It would be preferable if the subject of justice in relation to disaster prevention, preparation and 
response, were not politically contentious and if there were a theoretical ground that could support 
those humanitarian intuitions and sentiments which are broadly shared.  That is, regardless of who is 
exactly deserving of what, many believe that in situations of disaster, the primary and immediate goal 
should be to alleviate everyone’s suffering and minimize all deaths. There are at least two 
philosophical ways in which such a consensus could be served, the first suggested by Rawls and the 
second by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  
In addressing the fundamental rules and institutions of a just society, Rawls does not believe that 
government need make provision for equality of distribution, provided that any new set of rules or 
institutions does not leave those who are less well off worse off than they were before.
31
 We could 
accordingly suggest that in preparing for and responding to situations of disaster, those who are already 
disadvantaged due to age, infirmity, poverty, or bias against them ought not, as a result of disaster, be 
worse off relative to others than they were before.  For example, if both middle-class and poor families 
lose their houses, poor families are relatively worse off because they have fewer additional resources. 
Thus, the compounded disadvantages of the black urban poor of New Orleans as a result of Hurricane 
Katrina, which months later left many jobless, homeless, and without hope of future community, when 
before they had some measure of all those things, would not be acceptable.
32
 If this application of 
Rawls’s principle entails that those victims of disaster who are less well off would require greater per 
capita compensation than others, it could be justified by something like Rousseau’s principle of the 
common good. According to Rousseau, part of the function of government is to further what is good 
for society as a whole, in ways that are not necessarily decided by majority rule, or that amount to the 
greatest well-being of the greatest number.
33
 It could on those grounds be argued that society as a 
whole is better off if there is amelioration of the conditions of a disadvantaged numerical minority that 
is less well off relative to the majority, as the result of a disaster. The justification would be that a 
society as a whole is morally diminished when the conditions of those who are already disadvantaged 
deteriorate further. Such increased inequality might undermine assumptions of commonality based on 
nationality or shared humanity, and radically divide groups at the cost of general social cohesiveness. 
These applications to disaster conditions of principles developed by Rawls and Rousseau are 
different from usual ideas of compensation because they require extra compensation in some cases, but 
without dependence on either ideological ideals of a welfare state, or pure benevolence. If such 
applications need justification beyond the justifications offered by social contract theory discussed 
earlier, the new justifications would fall under the general rubric of humanitarian concerns. 
Humanitarian concerns tend at present to be theoretically addressed by scholars of international affairs, 
rather than political theorists or ethicists, but in the case of disasters they might be addressed by 
political philosophers who are otherwise concerned with the normal conditions of life in relatively 
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secure and affluent societies. This extension or application of political philosophy would be highly 
relevant during times in which relatively secure and affluent societies face new dangers. 
 
Existentialism 
Finally, there is the existentialist dimension. Existentialism became famous during the middle of the 
twentieth century, through the novels, plays, and philosophical work of Jean-Paul Sartre.
34
 It was 
popularized as a gloomy, nihilistic outlook on life, generated by Frenchmen in smoke-filled cafes. But 
as Sartre emphasized in “Existentialism is a Humanism,” the aim of existentialism was to provide a 
realistic description of the universal human condition, with an emphasis on free choice. According to 
Sartre, and in the tradition of Socrates (who counseled his followers to take care of their souls and 
“practice dying”), what human beings are at any given time is the result of their past choices in life. 
There is no pre-formed human nature, or “essence,” and what we become is the result of our own 
projects; what we become is what we make of ourselves. We must continually make choices in our 
existence and there is no way to evade that requirement or the responsibility it entails.  However, we 
are mortal beings and our eventual death is not something that we can avoid. But (and here one of 
Sartre’s major influences, Martin Heidegger, is pertinent) most people live in the bad faith or 
inauthenticity of pretending that death has nothing to do with them personally, as their own death,  but 
is rather always something that happens to other people.
35
 
The relevance of existentialism to a philosophy of disaster is the fact of human mortality and the 
tendency of members of the public in modern society to pretend that death is not something that 
concerns them immediately and inevitably. With or without disasters, we will all surely die and, worse 
than that, we are all subject to dying at any given moment. But even though the public seems to have a 
robust acceptance of images of death and destruction in both entertainment and news reporting, this 
does not mean that most ordinary people have come to terms with the basic facts about their own 
mortality and vulnerability. A (perhaps universal) tendency to deny one’s own death can make it seem 
as though any unusual threat to human life, from terrorist bombs, to earthquakes, to a flu virus that has 
“crossed over” to our species from birds, is the only thing that can possibly kill us.  Victims killed in a 
disaster may be grieved as though they would have lived forever had they not been killed in that 
disaster, as though they would not have eventually died from something else. The philosophical point 
is that the horrific nature of death by disaster turns on a question of how we choose to die. The first 
step is for individuals to acknowledge that they will inevitably die. The second step is to reflect on how 
one would prefer to die. The third step is decide that one does not want to die in this or that disaster. 
This decision can motivate an insistence that all reasonable steps be taken to minimize the loss of 
human life in future disasters, steps that range from the informed actions of ordinary people to the 
broadest policy decisions of their leaders.   
 
CONCLUSION 
I have offered a general sketch of how philosophers might contribute to the multi-disciplinary field of 
homeland security and disaster studies, while at the same time extending political and moral 
philosophy. Modern political philosophy in the West has proceeded from the idea of a state of nature, 
as a standard of human life, according to which the very existence of government is justified. The 
temporary dysfunction of government in some disasters may lead to a second state of nature that 
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requires new thought about the social contract. Moral philosophers often treat virtue ethics, deontology 
and consequentialism as contending ethical theories, but situations of disaster may require 
combinations of all three systems. Similarly, thought about disaster can motivate combinations of 
justice as fairness and distributive justice, in ways that are otherwise precluded in political debate. And 
finally, the emphasis on human mortality developed by existentialists may require a distinction 
between death by normal causes and death in disaster. 
This sketch of a philosophical contribution and application is intended to be both general and open-
ended. Its purpose is to stimulate multi-disciplinary theoretical discussion. 
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